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The doctrine of inequitable conduct in patent law has a long and vexing history. While it is
sometimes mistakenly conflated with the United States Patent and Trademark Office's Rule
56, the doctrine is actually a purely equitable one established by the Supreme Court in 1945-
and not revisited by it since then. This Article re-establishes the roots and proper context of
the doctrine, while tracing its confused interactions with Rule 56 over the ensuing decades.
The Article reaffirms the necessary balancing act between over and under disclosure of
references during patent prosecution, and the inverse sliding scale relationship of materiality
and intent to deceive for courts' invocation of the doctrine as a patent litigation defense
rendering the patent unenforceable. It concludes by proposing a "damages-at-law only"
litigation tactic by patent owners to preclude the use of the doctrine by defendants.
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DEFUSING THE "ATOMIC BOMB" OF PATENT LITIGATION: AVOIDING AND
DEFENDING AGAINST ALLEGATIONS OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AFTER
MCKESSON ETAL.
SEAN M. O'CONNOR *
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of inequitable conduct as a defense to patent infringement has a
long and vexing history. Many practitioners and commentators thought it had been
brought under control by the en bane statement of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") appended to the 1988 panel
decision in Kingsdown Medcal Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.1  Additionally,
further amendments by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")
to both Rule 56 and the Information Disclosure Statement ("IDS") Rules since then
seemed to bring some certainty and clarity to how patent applicants and their
attorneys could meet their duties of candor and good faith to the USPTO-and hence
defend against allegations of inequitable conduct by later patent infringement
defendants. 2 However, a set of cases in the mid 2000s brought all of this into
question. 3 In particular, practitioners are now contemplating submitting everything
to the USPTO during patent prosecution that might have even the remotest bearing
on the patentability of the invention at issue. Because the recent inequitable conduct
cases turn on the withholding of documents from the USPTO that are later deemed
material to prosecution, the inclination now is to deluge the USPTO with a host of
documents that would likely not have been submitted under earlier applications.
However, the USPTO does not even seem to want all of these documents. Further,
such practices by patent attorneys will result in significantly higher costs to patent
applicants.
Ironically, such practices may not even have their desired effect. Many
attorneys seem to view the doctrine and its case law as a ratchet moving only in the
direction of more voluminous disclosure. However this Article argues that the fact or
appearance of "burying" material documents within a ream of less relevant
references remains a solid ground for a finding of inequitable conduct. Thus, instead
of advocating a course of "more is better," this Article revisits the core meaning of
"materiality" and argues that the concept is more critical than ever in avoiding
successful allegations of inequitable conduct. The Article makes the case that even
*Professor of Law and Chair, Law, Technology and Arts Group, University of Washington
School of Law; Of Counsel, Seed IP Law Group. The Author thanks Karl Hermanns, Clark
Lombardi, Eric Schnapper, and the editors of the Journal for helpful input on this article. Generous
funding for research that led to this article was provided by Seed IP Law Group, PLLC. All opinions
expressed, and any errors or omissions contained, herein are solely those of the Author.
1 863 F.2d 867, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (resolving conflicting precedent), see, e.g.,
Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 37, 82-83 (1993).
2 See discussion infra Part II.
3 See discussion infra Part II.
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the recent troubling cases can still be reconciled with this core principle of
materiality.
At the same time, the Article concedes that there is something troubling and
unpredictable about the doctrine. If nothing else, the excessive use of it is
troublesome for individual attorneys and the patent bar overall. It has become the
wild card of patent litigation. While the heightened pleading requirement imposed
by the recent Federal Circuit decision in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart StoreS, Inc.4
should limit the flimsier uses of the defense, the fundamental infirmities of the
doctrine remain. Accordingly, this Article advances a novel theory for how patent
owners might cut off the use of the defense in the first place. Because the doctrine is
premised on the patent owner's coming to equity with unclean hands, a patent owner
could bring the infringement suit only for damages, and not for any equitable
remedies such as injunctions. The two obstacles to this are: 1) patent owners nearly
always want the leverage that the potential of injunctive relief accord them; and 2)
some may argue that the mixed law-equity nature of contemporary federal courts
means that even if the plaintiff does not bring equitable claims, the defendant may
still be able to invoke equitable defenses. The Article addresses both of these
concerns as well as a few others and concludes that in certain circumstances the
tactic could be valuable for plaintiffs.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I revisits the history of the doctrine up
through the i'ngsdown consensus statement. Part II analyzes the current state of
the doctrine, including the troubling cases of the mid 2000s and up through the
recent corrective decision in Exergen. Part III then concludes the Article by
reaffirming the centrality of materiality to the decisions of what to disclose to the
USPTO during prosecution and sketching out the possible use of a damages-only
patent infringement suit to cut off use of the inequitable conduct defense.
I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
This Part first revisits the origins of the inequitable conduct doctrine in the case
law, before turning to the development of the USPTO's Rule 56 and IDS Rules. As a
preliminary matter, none of the Patent Acts before the 1819 amendments even
provided for actions in equity. 5 Thus, injunctions were not obtainable and the only
remedy for aggrieved patent owners was to seek damages.6 Up until 1836, members
of the public could challenge issued patents in court within a certain time period
after issuance, if the plaintiff could show that the defendant's patent "was obtained
surreptitiously by, or upon, false suggestion."7 However, this was eliminated in the
4 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
5 Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, § 1, 3 Stat. 481, 481-82 (repealed 1836) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 283 (2006)) (granting federal courts the authority to grant injunctions).
6 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836) (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (2006)) (providing damages for making, devising and using, or selling any patented art
without the consent of the patentee); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793)
(current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)) (same).
7 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. at 111 (providing that such actions must be commenced
within one year of patent issuance); see also Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. at 323
(extending the time period to within three years of patent issuance).
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Patent Act of 1836, which repealed all of the previous Acts.8 All of the Acts up
through the Consolidated Patent Act of 1870 also allowed defendants to mount a
defense based on allegations that patentee-plaintiffs had not included the "whole of
the truth" in the specifications for their patents. 9 But these provisions seem to be
directed more at patents that were either too broad ("more than is necessary to
produce the desired effect") or inadequately enabled ("less than the whole truth
relative to his invention or discovery"),1 rather than as a defense for general fraud
on the Patent Office. In other words, some limited kinds of fraud on the Patent
Office were allowed to be shown by defendants as a defense, namely those in which a
patentee tried to mislead the Patent Office (and by extension the public) either to
grant too broad of a patent or to grant a patent even though the specification did not
enable the invention for the public."
A. Origins of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine as a Judicial Doctrine
Up until the end of the nineteenth century, infringement defenses predicated on
any kind of fraudulent procurement of patents were limited to cases in which the
patentee had deceived the Patent Office to obtain a larger scope of patent rights or
had misappropriated the invention from another.12 All other fraudulent procurement
would have to be remedied by intervention of the United States Government. In fact,
the United States Government successfully sued to void a patent granted to
Alexander Graham Bell in the 1888 case of United States v. American Bell Telephone
Co.13 However, as both the statutory private defenses and fraudulent procurement
actions by the Government were based on common law notions of fraud, private
defendants and the Government had to show the requisite scienter on the part of the
patentee.14
In the twentieth century, however, the notion that patent applicants should
disclose "material" references that they were aware of to examiners during
prosecution began to take root. The 1928 United States Supreme Court case of
Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp.15 suggested that fraudulent
procurement of claims based on misstatements by patentees in their applications
must be material to the examiner. 16 In particular, the Corona Court distinguished
"reckless" statements from "material" statements. 17 Thus, the state of play by the
early twentieth century seemed to be that private defendants and the United States
Government had certain avenues for using fraudulent procurement as either a
8 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117, 117 (repealed 1870).
9 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 6, 1 Stat. at 111; accord Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat.
198, 208 (repealed 1952) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006)); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357,
§ 15, 5 Stat. at 123; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. at 322.
10 See, e.g., Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. at 208.
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
14 See id. at 353-55 (charging that Bell "knew that every material part... [was] not his
invention").
15 276 U.S. 358 (1928).
16 Id. at 374.
17 Jd
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defense or basis of an action to void a patent, respectively, but only so long as they
could show scienter with regard to misstatements that were material to the issuance
of the patent.
However, in its 1945 decision in Precision Instrument Mfg., Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Machnery Co., the Supreme Court opened up a whole new avenue for
infringement defendants.18 It held that courts sitting in equity could choose to
withhold their equitable powers to fashion relief for the patentee-plaintiff where that
party came to the case with such "soiled hands" that it would violate the equitable
maxim that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands."19  To
paraphrase an old saying, strange facts make strange law. As has been the case for
many of the key decisions in the development of the inequitable conduct doctrine,
this case was based on odd and troubling facts. Further, many of fact patterns in the
various key inequitable conduct cases fell outside of the "traditional" statutory
fraudulent procurement issues of overly broad scope, lack of true enablement, or
misappropriation from the true original inventor. 20 Accordingly, they presented
difficult cases of harms without remedies. The doctrine of inequitable conduct, then,
is confused and confusing because it is essentially a grab bag of cases where courts
sitting in equity attempt to prevent patentee-plaintiffs from benefitting from their
own wrongdoing in cases where there is no clear statutory or regulatory path for
either a private infringement-defendant or even the United States Government to
counter such wrongdoing. The resultant collection of essentially ad hoe decisions will
almost by definition defy any attempts to create uniform criteria or principles, except
at the most abstract level.
In Precision Instrument, Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.
("Automotive") was the manufacturer of torque wrenches developed by one of its
employees, Zimmerman. 21  It sold these torque wrenches to Snap-On Tools
Corporation ("Snap-On").22 Another of Automotive's employees, Thomasma, secretly
gave information about the torque wrenches to an outsider, Larson, and together
they developed a new torque wrench. 23 Thomasma would later claim that the
18 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945). The issue had likely been building since the late 1800s cases
discussed above and was in fact raised in two cases before Precision instruments that also wound up
in the Supreme Court. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 251 (1944)
(setting aside previously granted judgment for patent infringement upon discovery of fraud on the
Patent Office); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 247 (1933) (holding that a
plaintiff alleging patent infringement must come with "clean hands"). But for procedural posture
and other reasons, the Supreme Court did not rule directly in those cases on whether a court could
dismiss a patent infringement suit solely on a defense of fraud or inequitable conduct. Hazel-Atlas
Glass, 322 U.S. at 250 (stating in dictum that "[hiad the District Court learned of the fraud on the
Patent Office at the original infringement trial, it would have been warranted in dismissing [the]
case."); Keystone Drller, 290 U.S. at 246 (stating in dictum that "[h]ad the corruption ... been
disclosed at the trial of the [previous] Case, the court undoubtedly would have been warranted
ranted in holding it sufficient to require dismissal of the cause of action. ).
19 Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814-15.
20 See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. at 240, 243 (regarding fraudulent submission of an
article in support of patentability and subsequent payments for continued silence); Keystone Driller,
290 U.S. at 243 (regarding the exchange of valuable consideration for the secrecy of a prior use that
would question the validity of a patent).
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development of the new wrench was all his work.24 Larson, Thomasma, and a third
individual, Carlsen, organized the Precision Instrument Manufacturing Company
("Precision") to supply Snap-On with the new wrenches. 25 Meanwhile, Larson had
filed a patent application on his own for the wrench, and assigned it to Snap-On days
before Precision was formed. 26 Based on the new wrench design, Precision quickly
took all the Snap-On torque wrench business away from Automotive. 27 Thomasma
worked simultaneously for Automotive and Precision until the former discovered his
position with the latter and discharged him.28 Snap-On appeared to have been
unaware of Thomasma's dual positions. 29
The Patent Office declared an interference between Larson's application and one
filed by Zimmerman (and assigned to Automotive).30 To Automotive's surprise,
Larson and Precision pursued the interference with zeal, with Larson blatantly lying
about dates of conception and reduction to practice in a way calculated to ensure his
priority of invention. 31 Thomasma disclosed the whole story to Automotive and
claimed that he, not Larson, developed the wrench and that Larson's patent
application and interference arguments were a "frame-up."32 Automotive's attorney,
Fidler, contemplated taking the information to the District Attorney and/or the
Patent Office, but did not do so. 33 He did consult with outside counsel who advised
him that the evidence would not be actionable by either the District Attorney or the
Patent Office (both of which were predicted to allow the interference proceeding to
play out first).34 Fidler did confront Larson and Carlsen's patent attorney, Alberts,
with the evidence and Alberts withdrew from representing Larson shortly
thereafter. 35 Larson and Carlsen retained new counsel, Hobbs, who agreed to help
them settle the interference with Automotive outside of the Patent Office. 36 A three
way settlement was agreed to and executed in the form of three contracts:
i) Automotive and Snap-On agreed that Snap-On would reassign the Larson
application to Precision (who would then assign it to Automotive under the next
agreement) and acknowledge the validity of the claims in both the Larson and
Zimmerman patents; ii) Automotive and Precision agreed that Precision would assign
the Larson application to Automotive and also acknowledge the validity of the Larson
and Zimmerman claims, even as the parties agreed privately that Zimmerman had
priority, and iii) Snap-On assigned the Larson application to Precision and assented
to the Automotive-Precision agreement. 37
24 1d.






31 Id. at 809-810.
32 Id. at 810.
33 Id. at 810-11.
34 Id. at 811.
35 Id. Butsee id. at 811 n.3 ("Alberts apparently never withdrew formally as Larson's attorney
in the interference proceedings by filing a document to that effect in the Patent Office.").
36 Id. at 811-12.
37 Id. at 813-14.
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All likely would have ended there, with Automotive controlling the patents that
finally issued on both the Larson and Zimmerman applications, but for the fact that
Precision introduced yet another new wrench and began selling it through Snap-
On.38 Automotive claimed that this infringed its patents and violated the settlement
agreements. 39 It filed suit against Precision, Snap-On, and Larson, who collectively
defended themselves by invoking the equitable principle of unclean hands.4 0 The
basis of Automotive's "soiled hands," they asserted, was that Automotive knew full
well how the Larson patent application involved outright lies and fraud on the Patent
Office-including the private agreement that priority rested in Zimmerman for the
invention-yet still accepted assignment of the application as part of the settlement
and then successfully prosecuted the application without ever disclosing the lies and
fraud underlying it to the Patent Office.4 ' The District Court dismissed all claims
and counterclaims for "want of equity" in a case focused on the sole issue of
Automotive's alleged inequitable conduct. 42 The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on
the grounds that the "District Court's findings of fact were not supported by
substantial evidence and that its conclusions of law were not supported by its
findings." 43
The Supreme Court took the case on certiorari "because of the public importance
of the issues involved."44 Focusing exclusively on the unclean hands defense, the
Court discussed that doctrine at some length:
The guiding doctrine in this case is the equitable maxim that "he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands." This maxim is far more
than a mere banality. It is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of
a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to
the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the
behavior of the defendant. That doctrine is rooted in the historical concept
of court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of
conscience and good faith. This presupposes a refusal on its part to be "the
abetter of iniquity." Thus while "equity does not demand that its suitors
shall have led blameless lives," as to other matters, it does require that they
shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in
issue.
This maxim necessarily gives wide range to the equity court's use of
discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant. It is "not bound by
formula or restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel the free and
just exercise of discretion." Accordingly, one's misconduct need not
necessarily have been of such a nature as to be punishable as a crime or as
to justify legal proceedings of any character. Any willful act concerning the
38 See id. at 814.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 807-08.
41 Auto. Maint. Mach. Co. v. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 143 F.2d 332, 333 (7th Cir. 1944),
rev'd, 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
42 Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 808 (discussing oral opinion from the District Court).
43 Id. (citing Auto. Maint., 143 F.2d at 333).
44 Id.; see Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 323 U.S. 695, 695 (1944)
(granting writ of certiorari).
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cause of action which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable
standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the invocation of the maxim by
the chancellor.
Moreover, where a suit in equity concerns the public interest as well as
the private interests of the litigants this doctrine assumes even wider and
more significant proportions. For if an equity court properly uses the
maxim to withhold its assistance in such a case it not only prevents a
wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression but averts an injury
to the public. The determination of when the maxim should be applied to
bar this type of suit thus becomes of vital significance.
In the instant case Automotive has sought to enforce several patents
and related contracts. Clearly these are matters concerning far more than
the interests of the adverse parties. The possession and assertion of patent
rights are "issues of great moment to the public." A patent by its very
nature is affected with a public interest. As recognized by the Constitution,
it is a special privilege designed to serve the public purpose of promoting
the "Progress of Science and useful Arts." At the same time, a patent is an
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access
to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic
consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in
seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or
other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their
legitimate scope. The facts of this case must accordingly be measured by
both public and private standards of equity. 45
The key parts of this dicta are that: i) the emerging doctrine of inequitable
conduct was a species of the genus of unclean hands equitable defenses; ii) in patent
cases, courts must consider both "private equity" and "public equity," almost as if the
public is a third party to the suit; iii) the equity court's discretionary power to choose
to not aid the "unclean litigant" is very wide and not bound by any formulas or
limitations that might "trammel the free and just exercise of discretion"; and iv) the
plaintiff need not have engaged in any activity that could be separately punishable as
a crime or that would even justify legal proceedings of any character for the equity
court to exercise its discretion to dismiss the case for want of equity.46 Thus, in this
seminal and still controlling case on inequitable conduct, the Supreme Court placed
an equity court's discretion beyond a limitation that a specific showing of any
particular kind of legally actionable conduct would be required for the court to
dismiss for want of equity.4 7
Notwithstanding the Court's establishment of a broad range of discretion for
judges sitting in equity to dismiss a patent suit for want of equity, it still took pains
to point out the egregious conduct of Automotive set out in the trial record:
[T]he District Court's action in dismissing the complaints and counterclaims
"for want of equity" was more than justified.
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The history of the patents and contracts in issue is steeped in perjury
and undisclosed knowledge of perjury. Larson's application was admittedly
based upon false data which destroyed whatever just claim it might
otherwise have had to the status of a patent. Yet Automotive, with at least
moral and actual certainty if not absolute proof of the facts concerning the
perjury, chose to act in disregard of the public interest. Instead of doing all
within its power to reveal and expose the fraud, it procured an outside
settlement of the interference proceedings, acquired the Larson application
itself, turned it into a patent and barred the other parties from ever
questioning its validity. Such conduct does not conform to minimal ethical
standards and does not justify Automotive's present attempt to assert and
enforce these perjury-tainted patents and contracts. 48
The Precision Instruments Court then appeared to impose a duty on patent
applicants that was not directly linked to, nor limited by, the Patent Act's statutory
anti-fraud provision:
Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office or who are
parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty to report
to it all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the
applications in issue. This duty is not excused by reasonable doubts as to
the sufficiency of the proof of the inequitable conduct nor by resort to
independent legal advice. Public interest demands that all facts relevant to
such matters be submitted formally or informally to the Patent Office,
which can then pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence. Only in that way
can the Patent Office and the public escape from being classed among the
"mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud."49
The upshot of the Precision Instruments decision was that an equity court can
simply decide that the patentee-plaintiff has done something that negatively affects
public or private equity in procuring the patent, whether or not rising to the level of
fraud, and thus the court is going to withhold its equitable powers to assist the
plaintiff in any equitable redress the plaintiff seeks against the defendant with
regard to the patent.5 0 This makes it sound as if the patentee-plaintiff perhaps could
seek a remedy elsewhere. And, in fact, in an older Anglo-American judicial setting a
plaintiff who had been barred from a court in equity would not necessarily be barred
from seeking damages in a court of law.5 1 The only thing he would lose is the ability
to obtain equitable remedies such as injunctions. Thus, one could infer that the
broad discretion afforded to judges sitting in equity to dismiss cases for want of
48 Id. at 816.
49 Id. at 818 (citations omitted).
50 See id. at 814-16.
51 See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (repealed 1952) (current version at 35
U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2006)) (granting the power of a court in equity to grant injunctions, and
separately, the right of a complainant to damages for patent infringement).
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equity is reasonable because the plaintiff likely still has the opportunity to seek
monetary damages in a court of law. In other words, the liberal discretion given to
equity judges does not close the door on all remedies for the plaintiff.
The rub, of course, is that patent cases must be heard in federal courts in the
United States and those courts currently do not generally separate their equity and
law based powers into separate adjudications.5 2 Rather, they can hear claims in both
equity and law simultaneously, and can fashion both equitable and legal remedies in
the same action.5 3 Further, because current United States patent law provides for
equitable relief, and such relief in the form of injunctions is seen as of paramount
importance to patentees, essentially all patent lawsuits will seek equitable as well as
legal relief and thus require the court to invoke its powers in both equity and law.5 4
An open question, however, is whether a patentee-plaintiff with any concerns about a
defendant's possible use of the inequitable conduct defense could sue an infringer
only for damages and thus keep the suit to one only in law, and thus foreclose the
defense of inequitable conduct.5 5
B. Development ofRule 56 and Subsequent Interaction with Inequitable Conduct
Case Law
Following Precision Instruments, but not directly related to it, the Patent Office
adopted its Rules of Practice in Patent Cases on March 1, 1949.56 These Rules
included the first instance of Rule 56, which was codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.56:
§ 1.56 Improper applications. Any application signed or sworn to in
blank, or without actual inspection by the applicant, and any application
altered or partly filled in after being signed or sworn to, and also any
application fraudulently filed or in connection with which any fraud is
practiced or attempted on the Patent Office, may be stricken from the
files.5 7
This original version of Rule 56 was clearly just a procedural rule allowing the
Patent Office to strike an application that was defective or being prosecuted through
52 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (providing Congress with the power to grant limited monopolies
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"); U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising underthis Constitution .. ") (emphasis
added); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (granting district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions relating to patents); FED. R. CIV. P. 2 ("There is one form of action - the civil action.").
53 See FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
54 35 U.S.C. § 283 (allowing district courts to grant injunctive relief "in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent"); id. § 284 (providing for
compensation upon a finding of patent infringement).
55 This would not, of course, forestall any defense provided for by statute or regulation such as
the defenses for fraudulent procurement of a patent with over broad scope, lack of true enablement,
or misappropriation from the true and original inventor as in place in the Consolidated Patent Act of
1870, as amended, that was in force when Precision Instruments was decided. See Patent Act of
1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208 (repealed 1952) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006)).
56 37 C.F.R pt. 1 (1949).
57 Id. § 1.56.
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fraud.58 Further, by its own terms, the original Rule 56 provided only for striking
applications-there was no provision for what could be done once a patent issued and
no private cause of action established during or after prosecution. 59 Framed in terms
of fraud, Rule 56 would also require the Patent Office to show scienterbefore striking
an application.6 0 But at the same time, Rule 56 did not, and could not, modify the
Supreme Court ruling in Precision Instruments.61 Thus, from the beginning, Rule 56
stood apart from the emerging judicial doctrine of inequitable conduct and at each
step of the way, as outlined below, seemed to simply follow and codify developments
in the judicial doctrine. Rule 56 remained in this original form until 1977.62
Outside of the promulgation of Rule 56 in the 1940s, the Supreme Court had
also recently issued a per curiam opinion in ingsland v. Dorse/63 regarding the
disbarment from Patent Office practice of attorneys who had helped fraudulently
procure the patents at issue in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.64 (a
case considered a precursor to the Court's decision in Precision Instruments).65 In
Iangsland, the Court adopted a statement made by the Patent Office committee that
had disbarred the attorneys: "By reason of the nature of an application for patent,
the relationship of attorneys to the Patent Office requires the highest degree of
candor and good faith. In its relation to applicants, the Office ... must rely upon
their integrity and deal with them in a spirit of trust and confidence ...."66
However, the Supreme Court held that the regulation and sanctioning of attorneys
practicing before the Patent Office was left exclusively to the Patent Office by
Congress, and not to the courts.67 This ruling set the stage for the divergent
inequitable disclosure issues facing modern patent attorneys: they are bound to Rule
56 standards and may be sanctioned or disbarred by the Patent Office for
transgressing them, 68 but they must also help limit the chance that their client's
patents will not be enforced if a court chooses to withhold its assistance by dismissing
a case for want of equity if a showing of inequitable conduct is made by the
defendant. 69
Thus, by the 1950s, the main contours of inequitable conduct were established.




61 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1-4 (1948) (authorizing the Patent Office to establish "regulations, not
inconsistent with the law").
62 Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5,588, 5,593-5,594 (Jan. 28, 1977)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
63 338 U.S. 318 (1949) (per curiam).
64 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
65 Kingsland, 338 U.S. at 321 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v.
Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
66 Kingsland, 338 U.S. at 319-20 (citation omitted).
67 Id
68 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE app. R §§ 10.22, 10.132 (8th ed., 7th rev. 2008) [hereinafter MPEP]; 37 C.F.R. § 1.56
(2008).
69 See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 808, 820
(1945) (concluding that the evidence supported the district court's oral opinion dismissing all claims
for "want of equity").
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inequitable conduct as a defense to an infringement suit or the power of the Patent
Office to sanction an attorney for violating the "duty of candor and good faith."
However, one additional area of fraudulent procurement of patents that the Supreme
Court ruled on after Precision Instruments was the issue of whether fraudulent
procurement of patents could give rise to an affirmative claim for violation of
antitrust laws by the patentee. Thus, in the 1965 case of Walker Process Equipment,
Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemicals Corp. the Supreme Court upheld a private
cause of action for parties who can make out a violation of federal antitrust laws by a
patentee who fraudulently procures patents (leading to so-called "Walker Process
claims").70
Passage of the Patent Act of 1952 did not add much to the clarity of the doctrine,
as it eliminated the defenses for specific frauds contained in the Consolidated Patent
Act of 1870. 71 The final piece of the puzzle for the emerging doctrine of inequitable
conduct was the culpability of the inventor herself when she takes the oath that she
is the first true inventor and knows of no statutory bars to the application. At least
one district court interpreted United States v. American Bell Tel. Co.72 to require the
Government to make out an intentional withholding of a fully anticipatory reference
in the prior art before the court would void an issued patent for fraudulent
procurement. In the 1957 case of United States v. Standard Electric Time Co.,73 the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that the failure
of the patentee to disclose masters' theses that he had used in formulating his own
ideas that formed the basis of both his doctoral degree dissertation from MIT and the
patent at issue did not rise to the level of actionable fraud against the Government
sufficient to void the patent:
There has been no showing that under any statute, or rule of the
Patent Office, or professional custom, or canon of ethics there is any explicit
or implicit obligation resting upon an applicant for a patent or his solicitor
to disclose to the Patent Office all the material which he has used in
evolving the invention he claims.
The applicant's obligation under 35 U.S.C. § 115 and under former
Rule 46 was to state whether to the best of his knowledge and belief the
invention has been described in any printed publication. Of course, a
putative inventor must disclose any printed publication which he either
knows or believes describes the very invention claimed. More than this, if
he knows of a printed publication which plainly describes his claimed
invention, or comes so close thereto that every reasonable man would say
the invention claimed was not original but had been anticipated, then
regardless of his personal view that he is the original inventor, he will not
be excused for his failure to disclose his knowledge. But the applicant has
no duty to cite every publication of which he knows, or which he has used,
70 382 U.S. 172, 175-76 (1965).
71 Compare Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208 (repealed 1952) (current version
at 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006)) (providing specific defenses to infringement for fraud), with Patent Act of
1952, ch. 11, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (providing specific to infringement for non-infringement or
invalidity).
72 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
73 155 F. Supp. 949 (D. Mass. 1957).
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merely because the publication is one likely to be referred to by a vigilant
examiner in the Patent Office, or by a rival in an interference or other
proceeding. It is not the object of the quoted statute or rule to supply all
available evidence to the Patent Office, or to force the applicant to set up
what he regards as straw men which he reasonably and in good faith
believes he can knock down.74
Nonetheless, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the circumstances in which courts
were willing to accept an infringement defendant's allegations of fraudulent
procurement or inequitable conduct in order to refuse to enforce a patent seemed to
be expanding. One commentator attributes part of this expansion to the addition of
the statutory requirement for nonobviousness in the 1952 Patent Act. 75 Under this
view, the limit of the disclosure requirement to fully anticipatory prior art, such as in
United States v. Standard Electric Time Company, made more sense under the
Consolidated Patent Act of 1870, as amended, because there was no requirement for
nonobviousness in that statute. 76 Of course, Standard Electric Time was decided
after the passage of the 1952 Patent Act, and the commentator does not address this
issue. 77 But, he does rest more of his argument on the change occurring most
noticeably after the 1966 Supreme Court decision of Graham v. John Deere Co.,78
which, as he cites the case, "focused the obviousness analysis on 'the scope and
content of the prior art,' rather than on judicially-created tests such as synergism or
unexpected results."79
The next major inequitable conduct case was 1970's Norton v. Curtiss in the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A.").80 The C.C.P.A. was reviewing the
Commissioner's decision not to strike the pending application of Curtiss that was in
an interference proceeding with the pending application of Norton.81 Thus, the
decision was squarely on the scope and interpretation of the original (pre 1977) Rule
56 and, by the C.C.P.A.'s own account, was the first time that court interpreted it.82
The court focused on interpreting the term "fraud" as used in Rule 56, and as used by
other courts in considering patent infringement defenses based on claims of
inequitable conduct by the patentee.8 3 Portions of the opinion are set out at length
below because the decision remains a seminal one. They summarize the converging
and expanding doctrines of fraudulent procurement and inequitable conduct,
including development and application of materiality standards. They also set the
baseline analysis that would be incorporated in both the 1977 Rule 56 overhaul and
the case law of the yet-to-be-formed Federal Circuit:
74 Id. at 952 (citations omitted).
75 Goldman, supra note 1, at 56-57; see Patent Act of 1952, ch. 10, § 103, 66 Stat. at 798.
76 See Goldman, supra note 1, at 56-57; see also Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 1, 16 Stat. 198
(repealed 1952).
77 See Standard Elec. Time, 155 F. Supp. at 949 (decided in 1957); Goldman, supra note 1, at
56-57.
78 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
79 Goldman, supra note 1, at 57 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17).
80 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
Sl Id. at 781.
82 Id. at 791-92.
83 Id. at 792.
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The term "fraud" is not defined in the rules and we have been unable to find
elsewhere any authoritative interpretation of that word as used in Rule
56 ....
... The only rational, practical interpretation of the term "fraud" in
Rule 56 which could follow is that the term refers to the very same types of
conduct which the courts, in patent infringement suits, would hold
fraudulent.
We note first that traditionally, the concept of "fraud" has most often
been used by the courts, in general, to refer to a type of conduct so
reprehensible that it could alone form the basis of an actionable wrong (e.g.,
the common law action for deceit). That narrow range of conduct, now
frequently referred to as "technical" or "affirmative" fraud, is looked upon
by the law as quite serious. Because severe penalties are usually meted out
to the party found guilty of such conduct, technical fraud is generally held
not to exist unless the following indispensable elements are found to be
present: (1) a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that
representation, (3) the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of mind so
reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be the equivalent of intent
(scienter), (4) a justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation by the party
deceived which induces him to act thereon, and (5) injury to the party
deceived as a result of his reliance on the misrepresentation.
But the term "fraud" is also commonly used to define that conduct
which may be raised as a defense in an action at equity for enforcement of a
specific obligation. In this context, it is evident that the concept takes on a
whole new scope. Conduct constituting what has been called earlier
"technical fraud" will, of course, always be recognized as a defense.
However, in these situations, failure, for one reason or another, to satisfy all
the elements of the technical offense often will not necessarily result in a
holding of "no fraud." Rather the courts appear to look at the equities of the
particular case and determine whether the conduct before them-which
might have been admittedly less than fraudulent in the technical sense-
was still so reprehensible as to justify the court's refusing to enforce the
rights of the party guilty of such conduct. It might be said that in such
instances the concept of fraud becomes intermingled with the equitable
doctrine of "unclean hands". A court might still evaluate the evidence in
light of the traditional elements of technical fraud, but will now include a
broader range of conduct within each of those elements, giving
consideration to the equities involved in the particular case. ...
Of critical concern in analyzing the first element is the question of the
scope to be accorded the concept of materiality. In technical fraud, to be
"material", the fact misrepresented must be "the efficient, inducing, and
proximate cause, or the determining ground" of the action taken in reliance
thereon. In patent cases, "materiality" has generally been interpreted to
mean that if the Patent Office had been aware of the complete or true facts,
the challenged claims would not have been allowed.
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However, the above test cannot be applied too narrowly if the
relationship of confidence and trust between applicants and the Patent
Office is to have any real meaning. Findings of materiality should not be
limited only to those situations where there can be no dispute that the true
facts, or the complete facts, if they had been known, would most likely have
prevented the allowance of the particular claims at issue or alternatively,
would provide a basis for holding those claims invalid. In such cases, the
claims at issue would probably be invalid, in any event, because of the
existence of those facts, in and of themselves. Whether the claims would
also be unenforceable because a fraud was committed in misrepresenting
the facts to the Patent Office would really be of secondary importance. It is
our view that a proper interpretation of the "materiality" element of fraud
in this context must include therein consideration of factors apart from the
objective patentability of the claims at issue, particularly (where possible)
the subjective considerations of the examiner and the applicant.
Indications in the record that the claims at issue would not have been
allowed but for the challenged misrepresentations must not be overlooked
due to any certainty on the part of the reviewing tribunal that the claimed
invention, viewed objectively, should have been patented. If it can be
determined that the claims would not have been allowed but for the
misrepresentation, then the facts were material regardless of their effect on
the objective question of patentability....
The state of mind of the one making the representations is probably
the most important of the elements to be considered in determining the
existence of "fraud." Perhaps it is most of all in the traditional element of
"scienter" that the existence of a fiduciary-like duty should have its effect.
As we have already indicated, the procurement of a patent involves the
public interest, not only in regard to the subject matter of the patent grant,
but also in the system under which the grant is obtained. Conduct in this
area necessarily must be judged with that interest always taken into
account and objective standards applied. Good faith and subjective intent,
while they are to be considered, should not necessarily be made controlling.
Under ordinary circumstances, the fact of misrepresentation coupled with
proof that the party making it had knowledge of its falsity is enough to
warrant drawing the inference that there was a fraudulent intent. Where
public policy demands a complete and accurate disclosure it may suffice to
show nothing more than that the misrepresentations were made in an
atmosphere of gross negligence as to their truth ....
We must emphasize that while we have recognized the requirement
that the provisions of Rule 56 be interpreted more broadly in this area of
inequitable conduct, the rule as to burden of proof has not changed.
Because of the importance of this issue, the courts have demanded that the
quantum of proof as to fraud be substantial. The standard has been and
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still is that proof of fraud must be clear and convincing. Thus, the one
asserting misconduct carries a heavy burden of persuasion.8 4
In many ways this was the first "modern" case of inequitable conduct. It
demonstrated how the elements of "traditional" (or as the court calls it "technical")
fraud were watered down to allow for findings of inequitable conduct when actions of
the original applicant or her attorney fell short of the normally high hurdles for each
element.8 5 The case also formally introduced the "subjective but for" test, in which a
court could find inequitable conduct so long as the examiner would have rejected the
application but for the fraudulent disclosure or withheld references, even if he would
have been objectively wrong in doing so. 8 6
The opinion also affirmed the introduction of recklessness and gross negligence
as potential triggers for a finding of inequitable conduct.8 7 Further, it began the odd
and ongoing interaction between case law and Rule 56.88 The C.C.P.A. was trying to
interpret the original version of Rule 56, and to do so it incorporated case law on
fraudulent procurement and inequitable conduct that had no direct connection to
Rule 56-other than the logic from a case in which the Commissioner of the Patent
Office asserted the Office should use the same standards to strike a patent
application for fraud that a court would use to void an issued patent for fraudulent
procurement.8 9 But therein lay the circularity that would come to define the troubled
relationship between Rule 56 and inequitable conduct case law. Further, the
C.C.P.A. did not restrict its guidance on these standards to cases in which the United
States Government sued to void a patent, but rather also included litigation between
private parties such as Precision Instrument90 At the same time, courts considering
inequitable conduct defenses in private party litigation were looking at the standards
being established in cases in which the United States Government sued to void a
patent for fraudulent procurement. 91 The upshot was that the various Rule 56
actions, United States Government suits to void fraudulently procured patents, and
private party inequitable defense cases, all became a kind of echo chamber in which
ever lower standards for finding the elements of fraud in one type of proceeding were
quickly adopted by courts or the Patent Office in other types of proceedings. 92
Depending on your point of view, this was either a classic "race to the bottom" or
"race to the top." Inversely proportional to the easing of the fraud element standards
was, of course, the heightening of de facto disclosure standards for patent applicants
and their attorneys to counter the effectiveness of inequitable conduct defenses.
84 Id. at 792-97 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (all emphasis added).
85 Id. at 792-93.
86 Id. at 795.
87 Id. at 796.
88 Id. at 791-92.
89 Id. at 791-93 (citing Inre Heaney, 1911 C.D. 139, 154, 171 O.G. 983 (1911)).
90 Id. at 792 (stating that interpretations of fraud apply to the issuance of a patent and as an
infringement defense); see Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
807 (1945).
91 See, e.g., Norton, 433 F.2d at 792.
92 See id. at 793.
[9:330 2009]
Defusing the "Atomic Bomb" of Patent Litigation
In 1974, the Patent Office issued guidelines for citation of prior art by
applicants, 93 but these were restated and/or superseded, as applicable, by the major
revision of Rule 56 in 1977 (the "1977 Rule"). 94 The 1977 Rule was more similar to
the form of Rule 56 today than it was to its predecessor. 95 However, it was amended
throughout the 1980s and then replaced in its entirety by the 1992 recodification, as
amended in 2000,96 which will be discussed in the next Part of this Article. The 1977
rulemaking also added Rules 97-99, which established the voluntary "Prior Art
Statement" disclosure program, which would later became known as the
"Information Disclosure Statement" ("IDS") program. 97
The most notable feature of the 1977 Rule was that Rule 56 was changed from a
straightforward provision enabling the USPTO9S to strike applications for fraud to
one that formally established a duty of candor and good faith by patent applicants
and their attorneys. 99 The primary penalty for any violation of Rule 56 remained
that the USPTO could strike a pending application. 10 0 Thus, once a patent issued
Rule 56 had no more effect as a USPTO matter.1 1 Separately, of course, the USPTO
could use an attorney's violation of the Rule as the basis for sanctioning or disbarring
the attorney from USPTO practice. 0 2 The question then is what effect, if any, the
1977 Rule should have had on subsequent court proceedings either in which the
United States Government sought to void an issued patent for fraud or in which a
private infringement defendant raised an inequitable defense. One might use Rule
93 Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5,588, 5,591 (Jan. 28, 1977) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (citing Notice of August 12, 1974, 926 O.G. 2).
94 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977).
95 Compare id. ("[J]ndividuals have a duty to disclose to the Office information they are aware
of which is material to the examination of the application."), and 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2008) ("Each
individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor
and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all
information known to that individual to be material to patentability .. "), with 37 C.F.R. § 1.56
(1949) ("[A]ny application fraudulently filed or in connection with which any fraud is practiced or
attempted on the Patent Office, may be stricken from the files.").
96 See Reissue, Reexamination, Protest and Examination Procedures in Patent Rules, 47 Fed.
Reg. 21,746, 21,747-21,748, 21,751-21,752 (May 19, 1982) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1);
Revision of Patent Procedure, 48 Fed. Reg. 2,696, 2,699, 2,710 (Jan. 20, 1983) (same); Revision of
Patent Practice, 49 Fed. Reg. 548, 549, 554 (Jan. 4, 1984) (same); Practice Before the Patent and
Trademark Office, 50 Fed. Reg. 5,158, 5,160, 5,171 (Feb. 6, 1985) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2
& 10); Miscellaneous Changes in Patent Practice, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,803, 47,806, 47,808 (Nov. 28,
1988) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2,021, 2,022, 2,034 (Jan. 17,
1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10); Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 65
Fed. Reg. 54,604, 54,623, 54,666-54,667 (Sept. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 5 & 10).
97 Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 5,591, 5,594; Revision of Patent
Procedure, 48 Fed. Reg. at 2,700 (amending section 1.97 to change the title from "prior art
statement" to "information disclosure statement"). Rule 99, 37 C.F.R. § 1.99, would eventually be
rescinded and reserved for later use. Duty of Disclosure, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,321, 37,327 (Aug. 6, 1991)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10).
98 The Patent Office was formally renamed the Patent and Trademark Office effective January
2, 1975, H.R. 7599, 93d Congress, 88 stat. 1949 (1975) (enacted).
99 Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 5,589-5,590, 5,593. However, the
PTO asserted that it was only codifying its existing practice and not introducing a truly new rule or
standards. Id. at 5,589.
100 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(d) (1977).
101 See id.
102 Id. §§ 1.344, 1.348.
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56 as a test for what the USPTO would consider actionable fraud under its own
standards. But the USPTO also stated that this policy was "believed consistent with
the prevailing case law in the federal courts."'1 3 And much of the 1977 Rule-from
its opening phrase of "[a] duty of candor and good faith" onward-seemed to come as
much from court decisions across the range of fraud and inequitable conduct cases as
from the original Rule 56.104
In its notice of final rulemaking, the USPTO acknowledged public comments
that expressed concern over the imprecise definition of the duty of disclosure, the
likelihood of a significantly increased burden on patent applicants, and the chance of
increased litigation. 10 5 The USPTO also gave critical guidance on the evolving
standard of materiality by citing the 1976 Supreme Court decision in the securities
law case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.10 6 In particular, the USPTO
shifted from using the term "relevant/relevance" in the proposed rule in favor of
using "material" in the final rule. 10 7 It cautioned practitioners that the meaning of
"materiality" from securities law cases should not be "automatically" transferred to
patent cases. 0 8 But it also established that materiality standards can be applied to
limit over disclosure as much as under disclosure:
[I]n formulating the definition of materiality in TSC Industries the
Supreme Court considered some of the same matters over which concern
was expressed in the public comments on proposed § 1.56. The Court noted
that the standard of materiality should not be so low that persons would be
"subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or misstatements," or so
low that the fear of liability would cause management "simply to bury the
shareholder in an avalanche of trivial information-a result that is hardly
conducive to informed decision making."10 9
While the concept of materiality in securities law has evolved over the
intervening decades, TSC Industries remains the seminal case. 110 In particular, its
discussion of the effects of material misstatements or omissions on the "total mix" of
information available to investors-and on which they make their investment
decisions-remains a central test in securities fraud cases to this day."' Further, the
definitions and tests of materiality that the Supreme Court rejected are equally as
instructive as the definition/test it adopted:
The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one,
involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a
reasonable investor. Variations in the formulation of a general test of
103 Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 5,589.
104 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
105 Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 5,589-5,590.
106 Id. at 5,589 (citing 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. (quoting TSCIndustries, 426 U.S. at 448-49).
110 See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, ESSENTIALS: SECURITIES REGULATION 30-31
(Aspen Publishers 2008).
111 See TSCIndustries, 426 U.S. at 449.
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materiality occur in the articulation of just how significant a fact must be
or, put another way, how certain it must be that the fact would affect a
reasonable investor's judgment.
The Court of Appeals in this case concluded that material facts include
"all facts which a reasonable shareholder Might consider important." This
formulation of the test of materiality has been explicitly rejected by at least
two courts as setting too low a threshold for the imposition of liability under
[SEC] Rule 14a-9. In these cases, panels of the Second and Fifth Circuits
opted for the conventional tort test of materiality whether a reasonable man
Would attach importance to the fact misrepresented or omitted in
determining his course of action....
In formulating a standard of materiality under Rule 14a-9, we are
guided.., by... recognition.., of the Rule's broad remedial purpose. That
purpose is not merely to ensure by judicial means that the transaction,
when judged by its real terms, is fair and otherwise adequate, but to ensure
disclosures by corporate management in order to enable the shareholders to
make an informed choice. As an abstract proposition, the most desirable
role for a court in a suit of this sort, coming after the consummation of the
proposed transaction, would perhaps be to determine whether in fact the
proposal would have been favored by the shareholders and consummated in
the absence of any misstatement or omission. But as we [have]
recognized... such matters are not subject to determination with certainty.
Doubts as to the critical nature of information misstated or omitted will be
commonplace. And particularly in view of the prophylactic purpose of the
Rule and the fact that the content of the proxy statement is within
management's control, it is appropriate that these doubts be resolved in
favor of those the statute is designed to protect.
We are aware, however, that the disclosure policy embodied in the
proxy regulation is not without limit. Some information is of such dubious
significance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm
than good.... Precisely these dangers are presented, we think, by the
definition of a material fact adopted by the Court of Appeals in this case a
fact which a reasonable shareholder might consider important. We agree
with Judge Friendly... that the "might" formulation is "too suggestive of
mere possibility, however unlikely."
The general standard of materiality that we think best comports with
the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as follows: An omitted fact is material if there
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote. . . . It does not require proof of a
substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused
the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard does
contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the
circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in
the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the "total mix" of information available.
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The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of
law and fact, involving as it does the application of a legal standard to a
particular set of facts. 112
The concept of "burying" references has evolved in patent law from these origins
in the 1977 Rule and the USPTO's citation to the TSC Industries standards. It
includes not only the "document dump" concept of an avalanche of trivial
information, but also the calculated tactic of hiding problematic prior art references
in a mountain of other references, with the hope that the examiner will not really
notice them, or at least not realize their import.113 The concept is similar to other
information-rich environments, such as drug warning labels, in which there may be a
temptation for persons who must disclose potential harms to bury these warnings
into dense text, or within many less-concerning warnings, in the hope that the
consumer will either give up on reading the warning label in its entirety, or simply
gloss over the truly concerning portions. Thus, materiality cuts both ways: one must
disclose not only all material information, but must also not submit so much
information of dubious materiality that the highly material references are buried.
Accordingly, current calls for patent applicants and their attorneys to simply disclose
every imaginable reference-no matter how material to the application and
examiner-may well violate Rule 56 as much as a failure to disclose a material
reference.
Not only did the USPTO incorporate the definition and guiding principles of
materiality from the case law in issuing the 1977 Rule, but it also did so for the term
"information": "It means all of the kinds of information required to be disclosed
under current case law. In addition to prior art patents and publications, it includes
information on prior public uses, sales, and the like."1 14 Beyond this, the USPTO
declined to venture: "It is not believed practicable to define information in the text of
the rule at this time."115 But it did disclaim some kinds of information: "the rule is
not intended to require disclosure of information favorable to patentability-e.g.,
evidence of commercial success of the invention. Neither is it meant to require
disclosure of information concerning the level of skill in the art for purposes of
determining obviousness." 116 These disclaimed categories are curious though, if one
believes that part of the expansion of the kinds of information required by courts and
the USPTO leading up to the 1977 Rule was largely due to the 1952 Patent Act's
statutory requirement for nonobviousness. 117  Or at least it left disclosure
requirements a one-way street-patent applicants would need to disclose the myriad
112 Id. at 445-50 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (first & second emphasis added).
113 See, e.g., Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 948, 964-65 (S.D. Fla.
1972), affd, 479 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In fact, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit had affirmed a district court's finding of inequitable conduct based on a patentee's burying of
a highly material reference in a list of references that arguably mischaracterized the material
reference as well. Penn Yan Boats, 479 F.2d at 1328. The Federal Circuit's 1995 decision in Mohns
PLCv. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1183-84 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cited this decision with approval, even
as it distinguished the facts in that case to overturn a finding of inequitable conduct by the district
court.
114 Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 5,590.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See Goldman, supra note 1, at 56-57.
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of references that might render their invention obvious, but they were not required to
disclose information that might bolster their case for nonobviousness. 118
How should this disclaimer of a requirement to disclose favorable references be
understood? On the one hand, the USPTO could have been relying on patent
applicants and their attorneys to be making the case for patentability and
nonobviousness all throughout the prosecution process anyway. But on the other
hand, then why bother with the disclaimer? One speculation is that because the
failure to disclose required material information was actionable in and of itself-even
if the patent should still have issued had the proper disclosure been made-the
USPTO may have been trying to avoid situations in which a patent applicant's
failure to disclose every favorable material piece of information could lead to the
paradoxical result that the application could be stricken. This was especially
important as the USPTO was drafting the 1977 Rule and its issuing commentary
with an eye to the use of the standards by courts in determining whether a patent
should be voided under suit by the United States Government or not enforced in a
private enforcement action where the defendant argued fraud or inequitable conduct
on the USPTO.119
The USPTO also addressed the concerns of patent applicants that the new
disclosure rules would create problems for confidential information. 120 The USPTO
reiterated its position that it kept applications confidential until the patent issued (at
that time), and suggested that it might engage in later rulemaking on this point. 121
Turning to the new section 1.56(b), the USPTO explained that it clarified
inventors' ability to satisfy their duty of disclosure by disclosing material information
to their patent attorneys, agents, or co-inventors. 122 The recipient party could then
make the determination of whether the information was in fact material and submit
it to the USPTO during prosecution as warranted. 123 New section 1.56(c) restated
the non-controversial original Rule 56 triggers for striking applications (signed or
sworn to in blank or without actual inspection by party, or altered or partly filled in
after being sworn to).124 New section 1.56(d) explicitly established that applications
may be stricken upon clear and convincing evidence that a fraud was perpetrated on
the USPTO.125
The USPTO explained why the term "inequitable conduct" did not make it into
the final rule:
The term "inequitable conduct" is dropped from § 1.56(d) as covering
too great a spectrum of conduct to be subject to mandatory striking.
Inequitable conduct that is equivalent to fraud is intended to come within
the definition of fraud. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals already
has interpreted "fraud" in existing § 1.56 to encompass conduct of this sort
118 See Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 5,590.
119 See id. at 5,589-5,590.




124 Id. at 5,594.
125 Id.
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[citing Norton v. Curtiss]. Moreover, § 1.56(d) as adopted calls for striking
an application either for fraud or for a violation of the duty of disclosure.
In § 1.56(d) "bad faith" is substituted for the term "deliberate" that was
used in the proposal. This change is to make clear that an intent to deceive
(or gross negligence equivalent to such an intent) must be shown before an
application will be stricken. Bad faith is not present if information is
withheld as a result of an error in judgment or inadvertence. 126
Towards the end of its commentary on the 1977 Rule, the USPTO addressed the
concerns of some patent attorneys and agents that the duties imposed under the rule
would conflict with their duties to their clients (a concern also leveled against the
new Prior Art Statements rules):
It is of course in the interest of the client to have a valid patent and
this cannot be obtained without disclosure of known material facts. It is not
inconsistent for an attorney or agent to fulfill his duty of candor and good
faith to the Office and to act as an advocate for his client. The submission
of information under § 1.56 does not preclude the submission of arguments
that such information does not render the subject matter of the application
unpatentable. 127
At the same time, the USPTO took the opportunity to remind patent applicants
of their own duty to disclose by pointing out that section 1.65 was also amended in
the rulemaking to require the applicant to acknowledge this duty.128 Thus the
USPTO seemed to suggest that patent attorneys and agents should not feel any
serious conflict in their duties as between the USPTO and their clients as the
attorneys/agents and their clients were yoked together in the duty to disclose by the
USPTO rules anyway. 129
The USPTO then turned to its new Prior Art Statements system and rules
promulgated with the 1977 Rule. While the system was not mandatory, applicants
were "strongly encouraged" to use it and the USPTO suggested that it would be "the
best way" for applicants (and presumably their patent attorneys/agents) to satisfy
their duty of disclosure. 130 Further, the USPTO would not "assure that prior art
disclosed in other ways will be considered by the examiner."'131 Finally, the USPTO
explained how the purpose of the prior art statement program and rules differed from
earlier proposals: "Unlike the proposed version of this paragraph, which called for an
explanation of why the claimed invention is believed patentable over the cited art,
the paragraph as adopted calls only for a concise explanation of the relevance of each
listed item."'132 As to what would satisfy the adopted purpose, the USPTO stated:






132 Id. at 5,591.
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This may be nothing more than identification of the particular figure or
paragraph of the patent or publication which has some relation to the
claimed invention. It might be a simple statement pointing to similarities
between the item of prior art and the claimed invention. It is permissible
but not necessary to discuss differences between the prior art and the
claims. It is thought that the explanation of relevance will be essentially as
useful to the examiner as the formerly proposed explanation of
patentability, and should be significantly less burdensome for the applicant
to prepare.
Section 1.98 requires a copy of each patent or publication cited,
including U.S. patents, to accompany the prior art statement. Several
comments questioned the need for burdening the applicant to supply copies
of materials that are present in the Office's files. However, substantial time
and effort often is needed to locate a document in the Office's files. Since the
person submitting the prior art statement generally has available a copy of
the item being cited, it is believed that expense and effort can be minimized
by having that person supply the copy in all cases. Consideration has been
given to proposals to allow the applicant to submit an order for copies of the
patents along with his statement instead of actually submitting copies.
This will be further studied, but to date no way has been found to assure
that the copies will be available to the examiner by the first action unless
the applicant submits them with the prior art statement. 133
Following the 1977 Rule, the USPTO made some minor amendments to Rule 56
and the Prior Art Statement program throughout the 1980s (most notably renaming
the latter the "Information Disclosure Statement" ("IDS") program). 134 However, it
did not majorly overhaul Rule 56 or the IDS Rules until 1992,135 as discussed below.
The Federal Circuit was formed in 1982136 and adopted much of the precedential
case law of both the C.C.P.A. and the Court of Claims, although it was not technically
required to do so. 137 Further, a number of judges from these other courts-such as
Judges Rich and Baldwin-were the initial appointees to the Federal Circuit. 138
Thus, absent a significant change of mind by any of them, future decisions could be
expected to be consonant with their prior ones. In 1983, the Federal Circuit decided
133 Id.
134 See Reissue, Reexamination, Protest and Examination Procedures in Patent Rules, 47 Fed.
Reg. 21,746, 21,747-21,748, 21,751-21,752 (May 19, 1982) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1);
Revision of Patent Procedure, 48 Fed. Reg. 2,696, 2,699-2,700, 2,710, 2,712 (Jan. 20, 1983) (same);
Revision of Patent Practice, 49 Fed. Reg. 548, 549, 554 (Jan. 4, 1984) (same); Practice Before the
Patent and Trademark Office, 50 Fed. Reg. 5,158, 5,160, 5,171 (Feb. 6, 1985) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pts. 1, 2 & 10); Miscellaneous Changes in Patent Practice, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,803, 47,806, 47,808
(Nov. 28, 1988) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10).
135 See generally Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2,021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1) (amending the rules of practice in patent cases regarding the duty of disclosure of
information).
136 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, H.R. 4482, 97th Cong., 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(enacted).
137 See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
138 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity
Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 751, 751 n.21 (2000).
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its first inequitable conduct cases. In Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. All Orthopedic
Appliances, Inc., a case not centrally concerned with inequitable conduct, the court
cited decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to assert that:
"Establishing that a patent was procured by fraud or with such egregious conduct as
to render it unenforceable requires clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence of an
intentional misrepresentation or withholding of a material fact from the PTO."'139
Further, "Although inequitable conduct requires less stringent proofs as to both
materiality and intent than common law fraud, mere evidence of simple negligence,
oversight, or an erroneous judgment made in good faith not to disclose prior art is not
sufficient to render a patent unenforceable." 140
Later that year, the Federal Circuit decided an appeal focused squarely on fraud
and inequitable conduct. In Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., the court
sought to answer three questions:
1. Did [the patentee] intentionally make material misrepresentations to
the PTO?
2. If it did, could that conduct have been "cured" during prosecution by
subsequent disclosure to the PTO before the patent issued?
3. If [the patentee's] prosecution activities were illicit, yet could have been
"cured," was its subsequent examiner interview disclosure sufficient to
cure the defects?' 4 '
The misrepresentations were initially in the form of affidavits containing data
amassed and submitted by a patent agent who was deceased by the time of the
litigation. 142 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit also had to grapple with how to
determine the intent to deceive by a now deceased individual.143 The affidavits were
undisputed to have been submitted to overcome prior art rejections by the
examiner. 144 Thus, the Federal Circuit found that both the affidavits and the
misrepresentations therein were material. 145 As to the deceased agent's state of
mind, the court stated that
[w]hile direct proof of intent to mislead is normally absent, such
submissions usually will support the conclusion that the affidavit in which
they were contained was the chosen instrument of an intentional scheme to
deceive the PTO. In any event, proof of the actual state of mind of the
139 707 F.2d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Square Liner 360, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d
362, 374 (8th Cir. 1982); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1274 (8th
Cir. 1980); Oetiker v. Jurid Werke GmbH, 671 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
140 Id. (citing Oetiker, 671 F.2d at 600).
141 722 F.2d 1556, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
142 Id. at 1559.
143 Id. at 1570.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1571.
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applicant or persons associated with or representing an applicant is not
required. 146
However, the court allowed that an applicant could cure an application tainted by
fraud or misrepresentation while the application was still pending, provided that
acknowledgment of the fraud or misrepresentation was made fully and adequate
remedial measures were taken. 147
In 1984, the Federal Circuit moved on to address the proliferation of tests for
materiality that were still being advanced by plaintiffs and defendants based on the
case law of the various appeals circuits hearing patent cases before the formation of
the Federal Circuit. In American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Ia., 148 the
court reviewed what it considered to be the four major tests:
It has been noted that courts have utilized at least three distinct orders
of materiality: (1) an objective "but for" standard; (2) a subjective "but for"
standard; and (3) a "but it may have" standard. Criterion (3) endorses
inquiry into whether the involved facts "might reasonably have affected the
examiner's decision as to patentability."
Although strikingly similar to the "but it may have" guideline, there is
yet another and official "standard." PTO Rule 1.56(a), explains materiality.
It says that information "is material where there is [1] a substantial
likelihood that [2] a reasonable examiner [3] would consider it important [4]
in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent."
The PTO "standard" is an appropriate starting point for any discussion
of materiality, for it appears to be the broadest, thus encompassing the
others, and because that materiality boundary most closely aligns with how
one ought to conduct business with the PTO. There is no reason, however,
to be bound by any single standard, for the answer to any inquiry into fraud
in the PTO does not begin and end with materiality, nor can materiality be
said to be unconnected to other considerations .... 149
This dicta may have contributed to the continued proliferation of inequitable
conduct defenses. By the end of the 1980s, it seemed that defendants would
automatically raise the defense based in part on the variety of materiality standards
permitted by the Federal Circuit. Further, this dicta enhanced the echo chamber and
circularity between the USPTO (through Rule 56) and the courts as to the standards
for inequitable conduct. To put a point on it, there should have been no surprise that
Rule 56 seemed to encompass the other tests-that was by design as the USPTO
attempted to assimilate the courts'own decisions. Also in 1984, the Federal Circuit
resolved the question as to whether a finding of fraud or inequitable conduct
invalidated the patent or only rendered it unenforceable in JP. Stevens & Co. v. Lex
Tex Ltd.150 The court first collapsed "fraud" into "inequitable conduct"-with the
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1571-72.
148 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
149 Id. at 1362-63 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
150 747 F.2d 1553, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
[9:330 2009]
The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law
former as a species of the latter-and then held that a finding of inequitable conduct
rendered all claims of the affected patent unenforceable (although otherwise still
valid).151
The next few years saw a continual increase in charges of inequitable conduct in
patent litigation, based in part on the Federal Circuit's willingness to review district
courts' findings on the matter. 152 Because questions of inequitable conduct were
mixed fact and law, the Federal Circuit did not have to show as much deference to
the district courts as it would have for questions of pure fact. 153 By 1988, however,
the Federal Circuit signaled its increased unhappiness with the confused state of the
doctrine and the incessant use of the defense by patent infringement defendants.
Judge Markey admonished that '[i]nequitable conduct' is not, or should not be, a
magic incantation to be asserted against every patentee. Nor is that allegation
established upon a mere showing that art or information having some degree of
materiality was not disclosed."'154 Judge Nichols separately tacked on an additional
paragraph to an opinion to inveigh against it:
We add one final word: the habit of charging inequitable conduct in
almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague. Reputable
lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other reputable
lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their client's interests
adequately, perhaps. They get anywhere with the accusation in but a small
percentage of the cases, but such charges are not inconsequential on that
account. They destroy the respect for one another's integrity, for being
fellow members of an honorable profession, that used to make the bar a
valuable help to the courts in making a sound disposition of their cases, and
to sustain the good name of the bar itself.15 5
Finally, in December 1988, the Federal Circuit attempted to bring some order to
the doctrine, and hopefully reduce its use, through an en banc statement appended to
a panel decision in i'ngsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.156 At the
heart of the inequitable conduct accusations was an incorrect transcription by one of
Kingsdown Medical Consultants' ("Kingsdown") attorneys of a series of previously
allowed claims from a parent application to a continuation. 1 57 The attorney copied
over an earlier disallowed version of one of those claims, which in its amended form
had been allowed by the examiner. 158 When the patent issued, Kingsdown sued
Hollister for infringement. 15 9 Hollister raised an inequitable conduct defense based
151 Id. at 1559, 1561.
152 See, e.g., id. at 1562.
153 Id.
154 FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Markey, C.J., majority
opinion).
155 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
156 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
157 Id. at 870-71.
158 Id.
159 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., No. 84 C 6113, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19509, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 1988), rev'd, 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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on the incorrect transcription. 160 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois found that the examiner "could have relied" on the Kingsdown
attorney's representation that the carried over claims were simply the allowed claims
from the parent application.' 61 Further, the court found the erroneous language to be
material because the claim was only allowed in the parent application in its amended
form. 162 The court then found deceitful intent on the grounds that Kingsdown was
either grossly negligent or its actions indicated an intent to deceive. 63 Because the
court found inequitable conduct with regard to this one claim, it ruled that the whole
patent was unenforceable under the holding in JP. Stevens.164
The Federal Circuit overturned the decision on the grounds that: i) the
erroneous copying was probably not gross negligence; ii) even if the erroneous
copying was gross negligence, a finding of gross negligence was not always sufficient
to infer deceptive intent; and iii) the acts of the patent attorney did not necessarily
indicate deceptive intent. 65 The Federal Circuit was persuaded that the patent
attorney's mistake was understandable given the "ministerial" nature of what was
being done, and in light of the fact that neither the examiner nor Hollister noticed
the error for a period of years either-even though Hollister had been closely
scrutinizing the patent and its prosecution history during that time. 166 It also
rejected the district court's inference of deceitful intent from Kingsdown's interest
and attempts to secure a patent that covered Hollister's product, provided of course
that the prosecution and scope of the patent was otherwise lawful: "It should be
made clear at the outset of the present discussion that there is nothing improper,
illegal or inequitable in filing a patent application for the purpose of obtaining a right
to exclude a known competitor's product from the market; nor is it in any manner
improper to amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor's product the
applicant's attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent
application."'167 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had
abused its discretion and its finding of deceitful intent was clearly erroneous. 168
It was the appended en bane "Resolution of Conflicting Precedent" statement
that drew the most attention to Ingsdown, however. 69 Although the case itself was
decided by a panel, the court acknowledged that it could only change precedent by an
en bane decision, and so the remaining judges of the Federal Circuit joined the panel
for the appended statement. 170 In particular, the court resolved the question of
whether a finding of gross negligence compelled a court to find an intent to deceive in
the context of the inequitable conduct doctrine:
160 Id. at *7-8.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at *8-10, *13.
164 Id. at *12-13; see J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
165 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 873, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
166 Id. at 873.
167 Id. at 874.
168 Id. at 876.
169 Id. at 876-77, 876 n.16.
170 Id. at 876 n.16.
[9:330 2009]
[9:330 2009] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law
We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to "gross
negligence" does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the
involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence
indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a
finding of intent to deceive. 17 1
The en bane statement also reaffirmed the rule in JP. Stevens that a finding of
inequitable conduct as to any claim rendered the whole patent unenforceable. 172
Further, the en bane panel addressed conflicting precedent about whether
inequitable conduct was a question of law or fact by asserting instead that "[w]e
adopt the ... view ... that the ultimate question of whether inequitable conduct
occurred is equitable in nature."'173 Presumably this still leaves it to the trial judge to
make a determination, based on factual inquiry as needed, as opposed to reading the
Federal Circuit's statement here to mean that inequitable conduct must be a matter
of fact, because it was rejecting it as a matter of law. 174 In other words, the Federal
Circuit's pronouncement relied on the tripartite division of decision making authority
in the trial court: fact, law, and equity.175 Normally, legal commentators and judges
concern themselves with determinations of whether something is a question of law or
fact. 176 But, of course, equity is traditionally distinct from law, even as the two have
become melded in contemporary American jurisprudence and procedure. 177 Thus, the
Federal Circuit was carefully reaffirming that inequitable conduct is an equitable
(and therefore not law) matter, which rests all and only with the trial court sitting
partially in equity for the patent infringement case. 178 This then also led to the
conclusion that a finding of inequitable conduct is at the discretion of the trial court
and may only be reviewed by the Federal Circuit under an abuse of discretion
standard. 179
The determination that inequitable conduct questions were primarily equitable
in nature had far reaching implications. While the Federal Circuit had to date
shown a great willingness to review district court findings on inequitable conduct on
an almost de novo basis-which in turn may have fueled the explosion of inequitable
conduct defenses-it was now severely limiting such review: "We, accordingly, will
not simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial court in relation to
inequitable conduct."180 It then quoted one of its own decisions from earlier that year
171 Id. at 876 (citing Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970)); see discussion supra Part
J.B (discussion of Norton).
172 liangsdown, 863 F.2d at 877.
173 Id. at 876.
174 See id. (reviewing an inequitable conduct determination under an abuse of discretion).
175 Id. ("As an equitable issue, inequitable conduct is committed to the discretion of the trial
court and is reviewed by this court under an abuse of discretion standard.") (emphasis added).
176 See, e.g., Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit:
Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 284-87 (2002) (discussing law and fact standards of
review).
177 Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in Copyright, 48 EMORY L.J. 1, 49-50 (1999)
("Despite the merger of law and equity, and the ascendency of codification, modern courts retain
much of their ability to exercise discretion in traditionally equitable matters.") (citations omitted).
178 liangsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
179 Id.
180 Id.
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to flesh out the abuse of discretion standard in these cases: "To overturn a
discretionary ruling of a district court, the appellant must establish that the ruling is
based upon clearly erroneous findings of fact or a misapplication or misinterpretation
of applicable law or that the ruling evidences a clear error of judgment on the part of
the district court."18 1
While Kingsdown did seem to slow the proliferation of the inequitable conduct
"plague," its limited holding could not resolve issues over materiality or even
questions of deceitful intent outside of negligence or gross negligence.18 2 At the same
time, growing concern by the patent bar over the evolution of Rule 56 and the IDS
Rules throughout the 1980s led to a move to push the USPTO to revise them.18 3 The
discussion of the 1992 amendments to these Rules, covered in the next Part, then
begins the analysis of the contemporary environment in which patent attorneys must
operate and determine what to submit to the USPTO during prosecution.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE CONTINUING INTERACTION OF INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT CASE LAW AND RULE 56
On January 17, 1992, the USPTO issued a final rulemaking to overhaul Rule 56
(the "1992 Rule").184 This new version of Rule 56 completely replaced the 1977 Rule,
as amended throughout the 1980s, including the very title of the rule, and is the
basis for the current Rule 56 (as amended only once in 2000).185 Continuing the "echo
chamber" phenomenon, the 1992 Rule began with essentially a quotation of key
language in Precision Instrument and then proceeded to once again largely codify
existing case law. 8 6
The 1992 Rule limited Rule 56 to a core duty to disclose-couched as part of the
larger duty of candor and good faith-based on a fairly technical definition of
materiality.18 7 It also shortened what had become a bloated rule under the 1980s
amendments.18 8 Substantively, it eliminated a former core purpose of the rule:
181 Id. (quoting PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (Bissell, J., additional views) (discussing Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d
1538, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1022 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
182 Id. ("We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to 'gross negligence'
does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in light of all
the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to
require a finding of intent to deceive." (citation omitted)).
183 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
184 Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2,021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
185 See id. at 2,034; Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals, 65 Fed. Reg. 54,604,
54,623, 54,666-54,667 (Sept. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 5 & 10).
186 Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992) ("A patent by its very nature is affected with a public
interest."), with Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)
("A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest.").
187 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
188 Compare id. (adding candor and good faith to the disclosure rule), with id. § 1.56 (stating
that a separate duty of candor and good faith exists).
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providing for the USPTO to strike applications in which fraud had been found.18 9 It
also largely abdicated the USPTO's role in determining fraud, as well as breaches of
the broader duty of good faith and candor. 190 Some commentators have suggested
that the USPTO sought to "overturn common-law precedents of the Federal Circuit"
through the 1992 Rule. 191 But this is an odd proposition when one understands that
the doctrine of inequitable conduct is an equitable judicial doctrine that accordingly
cannot be "overturned" by agency rules. 192 The only non-judicial fix for the doctrine
is Congressional action to amend the permissible defenses under 35 U.S.C. § 282.193
However, based on the Supreme Court's holding in Precision Instrument, even this
Congressional fix may not preclude courts from using their discretion in cases
invoking their equitable powers-as must always be the case when injunctive or
other extraordinary relief is sought-and decline to grant relief to those who come
into equity with unclean hands.194 This power flows simply from the courts' inherent
powers-again when sitting even partially in equity-and cannot be abrogated by
Congress absent some stripping of the courts' equitable powers (which may or may
not be constitutional). 195
Accordingly, what the 1992 Rule really did, in conjunction with the new IDS
rules promulgated simultaneously, was to create a pseudo-safe harbor in which if the
patent applicant and her attorneys/agents comply with the rules in their disclosure
and IDS submissions, the USPTO will deem them to have satisfied their duty of
disclosure. 196  This would have the effect of limiting a patent infringement
defendant's defense of inequitable conduct as the defendant would seem to have been
denied a prima facie case of patentee plaintiffs breach of the duty to disclose. But, it
is indeed only a pseudo-safe harbor because the defendant is still free to try to show
that the patentee plaintiff (or her attorneys/agents) in fact did not disclose all known
material information, or misrepresented or buried disclosed material information.
Additionally, the defendant would still be free to show that the patentee plaintiff had
engaged in other activities that breached the duty of candor and good faith, even if
patentee plaintiff and her attorneys/agents had otherwise complied with the specific
duty to disclose.
The 1992 Rule also formally introduced the exemption for disclosure of
information that was merely cumulative of other information disclosed.197  In
comments and replies to public comments accompanying the notice of final
rulemaking, the USPTO specifically claimed that nothing in the 1992 Rule obligated
patent applicants, or their attorneys/agents, to conduct a search of their files for
189 Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992) (stating that any fraud or attempted fraud on the USPTO
can result in an application being stricken), with 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1991) (omitting any reference to
fraud on the USPTO or failure to disclose as reasons for striking an application).
190 Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 2,021.
191 See 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 2.9, at 2-23 n.2 (4th ed. 2008) (citation
omitted).
192 See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("[T]he ultimate question of whether inequitable conduct occurred is equitable in nature.").
193 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (providing statutory defenses to infringement).
194 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945).
195 See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution ... ").
196 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56, 1.97 (1992); Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 2,022, 2,034-2,035.
197 Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 2,022, 2,034.
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material information. 198 Instead, all that was required was disclosure of information
contemporaneously known to be material.199  However, the USPTO seemed to
vacillate in these non-binding comments between making it clear that immaterial
information was not required to be submitted, on the one hand, but that the
applicant and attorney/agents should "submit information for consideration by the
Office in applications rather than making and relying on their own determinations of
materiality."20 0 It is unclear whether this was intended to overturn the USPTO's
1977 Rule guidance that specifically incorporated the TSC Northway securities case
statement that too much information-an avalanche of trivial information-could be
as much of a fraud or problem for investors as too little information, or outright
misstatements. 20 1 Analogously, the USPTO and courts had already developed the
prohibition on "burying" material information in a host of other less material
information. 20 2 The USPTO's comments in the 1992 rulemaking can be reconciled
with the prohibition on burying by concluding that the USPTO was only
allowing/encouraging applicants to submit borderline information such that the
applicant could reduce its chances of being found to have engaged in inequitable
conduct later in litigation. Presumably this permissiveness for relatively immaterial
information would still be bounded by any intentional effort by applicants to bury
highly material information in an avalanche of information of dubious relevance, in
the hopes that the examiner would miss or gloss over the highly material reference.
The USPTO's interest in allowing borderline material information also seemed to be
based on its stated intent to give cover to applicants that they were not representing
that all submitted information was in fact material, and thus creating a prima facie
case of unpatentability. 20 3 The applicant could thus claim that it was merely being
fulsome in its disclosure-and not engaging in any fraudulent attempt to bury
critical references.
The 1992 rulemaking also amended section 1.63 so that the oath of applicant
had to include a statement that the applicant "Acknowledges the duty to disclose to
the Office all information known to the person to be material to patentability as
defined in § 1.56" as well as that the applicant acknowledged this duty in a
continuation-in-part application as to material information "which became available
between the filing of the prior application and the national or PCT international
filing date of the continuation-in-part application."20 4 The rulemaking moved the
former Rule 56 provisions regarding oaths signed in blank, or for applications later
altered, or only partially filled in, to a new subsection of section 1.67.205 Finally, the
1992 rulemaking substantially revised and restated the IDS Rules. 206
198 Id. at 2,027 (Comment 33 Reply).
199 Id. at 2,025 (Comment 16 Reply).
200 Id. at 2,023-2,024 (Comment 4 Reply).
201 See Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5,588, 5,589-5,590 (Jan. 28,
1977) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-
49 (1976)).
202 See id.
203 Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 2,023.
204 Id. at 2,034.
205 Compare id. at 2,021 (amending Rule 67 to include supplemental oaths and variations),
with 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1991) (listing conduct regarding blank oaths within Rule 56).
206 Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 2,034-2,035.
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Following the 1992 Rule and JIngsdown, it seemed as if the expansive use of the
inequitable conduct defense was finally ratcheted back. However, a line of cases
emerged involving fact patterns with hidden or obscured relationships between
experts submitting affidavits on behalf of applicants and the applicants themselves.
Thus, the 1993 Federal Circuit decision in Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM
Laboratories., Inc., upheld the dismissal of Paragon's infringement case against KLM
by the district court on summary judgment for unenforceability of the patent due to
inequitable conduct, as well as because the patent was invalid on other grounds.20 7
During prosecution, the examiner was unconvinced about the non-obviousness of the
invention and entered a note into the file following an applicant interview that the
applicant would submit Rule 132 affidavits from "disinterested third parties."208 The
applicant then submitted affidavits from three experts, all of whom had been paid
consultants to, and/or held stock in, the applicant's company.20 9 During litigation,
the patent attorney averred that he knew of the relationship, but believed in good
faith that the facts did not make the experts "interested parties."210  The district
court and Federal Circuit rejected this as both an unreasonable judgment on the part
of the attorney and highly suspect as the attorney only raised these claims in the
context of litigation.211 Further, both courts found a "deliberate artfulness" in the
expert affidavits' statements with regard to interest in the applicant/patent, which
statements read: "I have not been in the past employed by nor do I intend in the
future to become employed by Paragon Podiatry Laboratories, a corporation which I
understand is the assignee of the interest in the above captioned patent
application."212  The Federal Circuit asserted that the only purpose of the
"gratuitous" averment that the affiant "understood" that applicant was assignee of
the patent was to further convey the impression that the affiants had no connection
with the applicant or knowledge of the circumstances of the patent before being
asked to be affiants.213 Accordingly, it found that the district court had not abused
its discretion in finding intent to deceive the USPTO.2 14 Because materiality of the
information was not disputed, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding
of inequitable conduct. 215
Paragon also contested the dismissal of the case on summary judgment. 216 It
argued that a finding of inequitable conduct could not be made on summary
judgment and instead required the fact finding of a jury.217 The Federal Circuit
rejected this, citing its own case law while admonishing against an over reading of
that case law.2 18 The court took the opportunity to once again hammer home the
207 984 F.2d 1182, 1184, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
208 Id. at 1191.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 1192.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 1191-92.
213 Id. at 1192.
214 Id. at 1191-92.
215 Id. at 1188-89, 1192.
216 Id. at 1189-90.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1190. The Federal Circuit cited its statements from both Burington Indus., Inc. v.
Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("A summary judgment that a reputable attorney
has been guilty of inequitable conduct, over his denials, ought to be, and can properly be, rare
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nature of inequitable conduct as an equitable doctrine, and thus entirely at the
discretion of the trial court judge: "The defense of inequitable conduct in a patent
suit, being entirely equitable in nature, is not an issue for a jury to decide."219 That
there are findings of fact required for a determination of inequitable conduct does not
mean that a jury need be used for this function. 220 The judge can use his or her own
fact finding capacity to rule on inequitable conduct at any time, including upon
motion for summary judgment.2 21 To counter Paragon's argument that it was
entitled to a trial by jury on the issue of inequitable conduct, the court cited Supreme
Court precedent to the contrary.2 22 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit once again
affirmed the tripartite nature of court powers in patent suits: matters of fact,
matters of law, and matters of equity.2 23 The latter two are squarely and exclusively
within the power of the judge to decide, and for matters of equity, the judge can
engage in her own fact finding, as needed, to decide the matter.2 24
Finally, the Federal Circuit also upheld the district court's finding of inequitable
conduct based on Paragon's withholding of clear evidence of commercial sales that
triggered the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (which was also the basis for the trial
court's finding of patent invalidity and affirmed by the Federal Circuit).225 The
Federal Circuit noted that the findings of inequitable conduct on the basis of the
misleading Rule 132 affidavits was sufficient to hold the patent unenforceable. 226
But, it also ruled on the withholding of evidence of commercial sales issue as it was
cumulative to the district court's finding of inequitable conduct and unenforceability
of the patent, and ultimately, part of the reason for its grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendant KLM.2 27
Following this decision, the Federal Circuit also upheld a district court finding of
inequitable conduct and patent unenforceability based on faulty affidavits in the
1996 case of Refac International, Ltd. v. Lotus Development Corp.2 2 8 The applicant
had submitted an affidavit from one of the co-inventors to overcome the examiner's
rejection of inadequate disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, which the examiner rejected
as "self serving."229 The applicant then submitted three affidavits from purportedly
indeed."), and KangaROOS USA., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("Although the intent element of fraud or inequitable conduct may be proven by a showing of acts
the natural consequences of which were presumably intended by the actor, this requires the fact
finder to evaluate all the facts and circumstances in each case. Such an evaluation is rarelyenabled
in summary proceedings."), to show that it had never closed the door on summary judgment based
on inequitable conduct, but rather merely had been pointing out that it entailed a high bar and thus
should be rare. Paragon PodiatryLab., 984 F.2d at 1190.
219 Paragon Podiatry Lab., 984 F.2d at 1190 (citation omitted).
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. The court cited Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) ("The Seventh Amendment
question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the characteristic of the overall
action."), and United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 706 (1950) ("Seventh Amendment applicable
to actions at law not equity actions."). Paragon Podiatry Lab., 984 F.2d at 1190.
223 See Paragon Podiatry Lab., 984 F.2d at 1190.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 1188, 1193.
226 Id. at 1192.
227 Id. at 1192, 1192 n.9.
228 81 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
229 Id. at 1578.
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independent or disinterested practitioners in the relevant field of art to attest that
they could practice the invention from the proposed disclosure in the application.23°
The district court found that all three had some prior connection with the applicant
and/or inventors that was not disclosed.231 Two of the undisclosed relationships were
found not to be material, but the third involved undisclosed employment with the
applicant up to six months before filing the affidavit. 232 The employment turned out
to have included exposure to, and training in, the very computer system at issue in
the invention. 233 On apparently a "two out of three ain't bad" theory, the applicant
claimed that the problematic affidavit was merely cumulative of the two found to
have immaterial omissions. 234 However, both the district court and the Federal
Circuit rejected this notion:
"We decline to place submitted cumulative affidavits in the same status as
unsubmitted cumulative prior art. While it is not necessary to cite
cumulative prior art because it adds nothing to what is already of record
(although it may be prudent to do so), one cannot excuse the submission of a
misleading affidavit on the ground that it was only cumulative. Affidavits
are inherently material, even if only cumulative. The affirmative act of
submitting an affidavit must be construed as being intended to be relied
upon.235
Further, both courts rejected Refac's argument that because the materially
misleading affidavit was not the sole source of the examiner's ultimate allowance of
the patent, the patent should not be rendered unenforceable just because one piece of
the total submissions was misleading.236 Refac also earned the "chutzpah award"
from the Federal Circuit by arguing that the materially misleading affidavit actually
had no probative value because it was merely the "opinion" of the affiant and not
factual. 237
By the mid 1990s, a potential drawback to the Federal Circuit's Kingsdown en
bane statement became apparent. While an insufficiently deferential Federal Circuit
may have encouraged defendants to raise inequitable conduct defenses because they
could essentially re-litigate them on appeal if unsuccessful, an overly deferential
Federal Circuit might also unwittingly encourage defendants to raise the inequitable
conduct defense because district courts were showing a strong openness to it, and
favorable findings were unlikely to be overturned under the more deferential
standard. 238  Some have suggested that district courts-especially those with little
experience in patent cases and/technology issues-may actually welcome things like
the inequitable conduct defense because they rely on fact finding the court may be
230 Id. at 1578-79.
231 See id. at 1579-80.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 1580.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 1583.
236 Id. at 1584-85.
237 Id. at 1584 (citation omitted).
238 See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(reviewing an inequitable conduct determination under an abuse of discretion standard).
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more comfortable with, e.g., bad actions, deceit, misrepresentation. 239 A decision on a
ground like this could allow the court to avoid the harder issues of the intricacies of
patent law and the underlying technology. 240
One surprising outcome of the 1992 revisions, however, was that it was not
immediately clear whether courts should replace the materiality standard of the
1977 Rule, as amended, with that of the 1992 Rule for patents prosecuted after the
1992 Rule took effect. 241 One might presume that the new standard should apply, if
for no other reason than that this was to be the standard that patent
attorneys/agents would be bound by. At the same time, however, because inequitable
conduct is a purely equitable doctrine it does not technically rely on compliance with
non-equitable rules such as the USPTO's Rule 56.242 In fact, district courts and the
Federal Circuit would arguably be bound by precedent to apply the existing
reasonable examiner standard, until or unless the Federal Circuit properly
overturned it, presumably in an en bane decision. 243 Even as late as 2003 the
Federal Circuit seemed to be dodging the issue.244 For example, in the first of the
mid 2000s controversial inequitable conduct decisions, the Federal Circuit discussed
but did not decide the issue in Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc. 245 It
was not until 2006 that the Federal Circuit finally resolved the issue in Digital
Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works. 246 Based in large part on the position the
Supreme Court left the courts in since its 1945 Precision Instruments decision, the
Federal Circuit held that any of the existing materiality standards could be applied
in a particular case:
For many years, we have held "that materiality for purposes of an
inequitable conduct determination requires a showing that 'a reasonable
examiner would have considered such prior art important in deciding
whether to allow the parent application."' This standard is based in part on
the standard of materiality articulated in the PTO's Rule 56, which
describes the duty of candor and good faith, otherwise known as the duty of
disclosure, before the PTO. However, in 1992, the PTO amended Rule 56,
creating an arguably narrower standard of materiality....
239 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo, Recent Developments in Inequitable Conduct/The (Statutory)
Duty of Disclosure/"Fraud" on the P. TO., 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 110, 119 (1991);
Edward V. Filardi & Mark D. Baker, Practitioner Perspectives on the Law of Inequitable Conduct,
Claim Construction, and the Doctrine ofEquivalents, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 845 (2004).
240 See Adamo, supra note 239, at 119; Filardi & Baker, supra note 239, at 845.
241 Under Molins PLC v. Textroniz, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995), courts were to
still apply the 1977 Rule materiality standard for patents prosecuted before the 1992 Rule took
effect.
242 See Iangsdown, 863 F.2d at 876 ("[T]the ultimate question of whether inequitable conduct
occurred is equitable in nature."); Duty to disclose information material to patentability, 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56(a) (requiring adherence to the rule to be granted a patent).
243 See id. at 876 n. 16 (stating that an en banc court is required to change precedent).
244 Of course, some delay would be expected as litigation over patents prosecuted after the 1992
Rule went into effect would not commence right away.
245 329 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[W]e have not decided whether the standard for
materiality in inequitable conduct cases is governed by equitable principles or by the Patent Office's
rules.").
246 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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Although we have affirmed findings of materiality based upon the new
Rule 56 standard, we have declined to address whether the new Rule 56
standard replaced the old "reasonable examiner" standard ....
However, this is not the first time that this court has been faced with
applying more than one standard of materiality. The inequitable conduct
doctrine, a judicially created doctrine, was borne out of a series of Supreme
Court cases in which the Court refused to enforce patents whereby the
patentees had engaged in fraud in order to procure those patents. Although
the Supreme Court did not articulate precisely what rendered a patent
unenforceable, the courts generally tended to apply a doctrine somewhat
akin to that of common law fraud, albeit broader. That is, the courts
required a showing that the information that was misrepresented to or
withheld from the PTO was material and a showing of wrongfulness, such
as deceptive intent, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. In 1949, the
PTO created its first version of Rule 56, prohibiting fraud before the PTO.
However, neither the Supreme Court nor the PTO articulated exactly
what constituted a material misrepresentation....
Even though the PTO's "reasonable examiner" standard became the
dominant standard invoked by this court, in no way did it supplant or
replace the case law precedent. Rather it provided an additional test of
materiality, albeit a broader and all-encompassing test. Similarly, the
PTO's recent adoption of an arguably narrower standard of materiality does
not supplant or replace our case law. Rather, it merely provides an
additional test of materiality. That is, if a misstatement or omission is
material under the new Rule 56 standard, it is material. Similarly, if a
misstatement or omission is material under the "reasonable examiner"
standard or under the older three tests, it is also material .... 247
Dayco and Digital Control set the stage for the second controversial inequitable
conduct decision in 2007's McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical,
Inc.2 48 At issue were co-pending applications with substantially similar claims.249
The patent attorney disclosed the co-pending application to the examiner, but failed
to update him when the examiner in the co-pending application introduced a highly
material new piece of prior art, rejected some claims, and ultimately allowed some
substantially similar claims (which could have presented a double patenting
problem).250 The attorney professed to having no recollection of the prosecution and
kept no records of details of the prosecution.25 1 Such records or recollection might
have provided a plausible, legitimate reason for the various decisions and thus
mitigated a finding of intent to deceive. 252 The attorney further claimed that, upon
reviewing the prior art at issue again in the context of litigation, the prior art was
247 Id. at 1314-16 (citations omitted).
248 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
249 McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., No. CIV. S-02-2669 FCD KJM, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76517, at *4, *6, *16 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2006), affd, 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2 5 0 Id. at *6-9.
251 Id. at *15-16, *43.
252 Id. at *43.
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merely cumulative of other references before the examiner. 25 3 Overall, the attorney
claimed that he would likely make all the same decisions if he were prosecuting the
patent again today.254 The district court found the prior art not cumulative and
highly material.255 It also found the co-pending rejections and allowances to be
material. 256 The Federal Circuit found no clear error in these findings.25 7
As to intent, the district court weighed out all the evidence, giving "credit" for
the attorney's disclosure of the co-pending application itself, but still finding the bad
acts to overwhelm that one positive fact.258 In particular, the district court found the
lack of a paper trail for the attorney's decisions to be quite troubling, especially given
the advice of the version of the MPEP in effect at the time which encouraged
attorneys to record their reasons for specifically considering and discarding
information as not material in their files. 25 9 The Federal Circuit found no clear error
to any of this either. 26 0
Of note, the Federal Circuit strongly rejected McKesson's argument that Dayco
had "changed" the law with regard to the need to disclose office actions in co-pending
applications, and that this "new law" could not be expected to have been adhered to
by patent applicants and their attorneys in the 1980s when the patents at issue were
prosecuted. 26 1 The Federal Circuit instead pointed to sections of the MPEP in effect
during that prosecution which clearly indicated that co-pending application office
actions should be disclosed.26 2 The court acknowledged that the MPEP does not have
the force of law, but the point was that the patent attorney knew or should have
known that office actions in similar co-pending applications were likely to be
material and thus needed to be disclosed.26 3
McKesson was not a unanimous decision of even its three judge panel (Judges
Clevenger, Bryson, and Newman). Judge Newman issued a vigorous dissent, arguing
that the attorney's failure to disclose office actions in co-pending applications-where
the co-pending applications themselves had been disclosed to the examiner-was
hardly clear and convincing evidence of intent to deceive. 26 4 She warned that this
decision would "return[] to the 'plague' of encouraging unwarranted charges of
inequitable conduct, spawning the opportunistic litigation that here succeeded
despite consistently contrary precedent."26 5 While it is not clear that McKesson does
in fact contravene Federal Circuit precedent, it does seem to underscore a growing
sense that the ingsdown consensus is breaking down. This is particularly
problematic given the standard use of three judge panels to decide appeals at the
253 Id. at *16, *42.
254 Id. at *70.
255 Id. at *34.
256 Id. at *57.
257 McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 915-16 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
258 McKesson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76517, at *69-71.
259 See id at *43, *48-49.
260 McKesson, 487 F.3d at 918-19.
261 Id. at 922-23.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 923.
264 Id. at 926 (Newman, J., dissenting).
265 Id. at 926-27.
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Federal Circuit. 26 6 It means that, as in McKesson, as few as two judges can decide an
appeal. Given the different personalities on the court, this possible fragmenting of
the Iangsdown consensus could in fact encourage spurious or opportunistic
inequitable conduct defenses because defendants may see it as worth their time to
take a chance on getting two out of three favorable judges on their appellate panel.
Following McKesson, the Federal Circuit decided Monsanto Co. v. Bayer
Bioscience N. V in January 2008, which became the third controversial inequitable
conduct decision. 267 The court affirmed the district court's finding of inequitable
conduct based on the failure of Bayer's patent attorneys to disclosure highly material
notes written by one of Bayer's scientists, Dr. Celestina Mariani.2 8 Her notes
extensively described the contents of a poster (the "Barnes Poster") delivered at a
large scientific conference which she attended. 269  While the poster was not
distributed, an abstract (the "Barnes Abstract") was made publicly available.270
However, it did not give the same level of detail about the Bacillus thuringiensis
("Bt") genetic insecticide technology as the poster and presentation did.27 1 Bayer's
patent attorney was aware of both the Barnes Abstract and Dr. Mariani's detailed
notes of the Barnes Poster and presentation while prosecuting the patent.272
However, all he disclosed to the USPTO was the Barnes Abstract. 273
The procedural background of the case is a bit more complicated than generally
discussed by commentators. Monsanto had initially brought a declaratory judgment
action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against Bayer
only for a declaration that it was not infringing U.S. Patent Nos. 5,545,565 (the '565
Patent"), 5,767,372 (the '372 Patent"), 6,107,546 (the '546 Patent"), and 5,254,799
(the '799 Patent").274 Bayer then counterclaimed that Monsanto had indeed
infringed the patents. 275 Based on this counterclaim of infringement, Monsanto could
then raise the inequitable conduct defense ("inequitable conduct" is not an
independent claim that declaratory judgment action plaintiffs can raise without the
patent owner itself coming to equity with its own claims).276 However, following the
Ma rkman hearing in the case, Monsanto first submitted a motion for summary
judgment on non-infringement and invalidity of the patents. 277 The court ruled that:
266 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006) (providing for panels of three judges unless sitting en banc, or
the Federal Circuit local rules provides otherwise); FED. R. APP. P. 47.2(a) ("Cases and controversies
will be heard and determined by a panel consisting of an odd number of at least three judges.").
267 514 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Monsanto 1.
268 Id. at 1241-42.
269 Id. at 1235-36; Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., No. 4:00CV01915 ERW, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97254, at *32-39 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Monsanto i1], affd, 514 F.3d
1229 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
270 Monsanto 11, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97254, at *48-49.
271 Id. at *27, *32-40.
272 Id. at *19-20, *25-26.
273 Id. at *26.
274 See Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience, N.V., 264 F. Supp. 2d 852, 853 (E.D. Mo. 2002),
rev'd, 363 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
275 Id.
276 See id.; see also J.P. Stevens & Co. v Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-61(Fed.Cir. 1984)
(stating that inequitable conduct is a defense to a patent infringement suit).
277 Monsanto Co. v. Aventis Cropscience, N.V., No. 4:00CV01915 ERW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27417, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2002), rev'd sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience, N.V., 363
F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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i) Monsanto did not infringe the '799 Patent and the '565 Patent in their entireties; ii)
Monsanto did not infringe one claim of the '372 Patent; iii) the '546 Patent was
invalid; and iv) some claims of the '372 Patent were invalid.278 Monsanto then
brought another motion for summary judgment claiming that the remaining patent
claims were unenforceable for inequitable conduct.279 In particular, it alleged that
another of Bayer's scientists, Stefan Jansens, had submitted a false declaration to
the USPTO to overcome initial rejections of the relevant claims by the examiner. 280
At this point there was no mention of Dr. Mariani and the Barnes Poster/Abstract.28'
The court granted this motion, as well as a third one that sought collateral estoppel
holding some of the patent claims invalid based on an earlier case involving the
parties. 282
Bayer appealed all three rulings and the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded
on all three ("Monsanto J').283 On the inequitable conduct ruling, the Federal Circuit
remanded on the basis that there was a question of fact regarding the circumstances
of Jansens' declaration. 28 4 On remand, Bayer dismissed all its claims with regard to
infringement of the '799 Patent, '372 Patent, and '546 Patent and submitted a
stipulation of non-assertion of these patents against Monsanto.28 5 This was likely an
attempt to preserve the patents from being held unenforceable in the instant
proceeding, which would render them unenforceable as against all other parties as
well. 28 6 However, the lower court still entered a ruling that all four patents were
unenforceable for inequitable conduct and did not revisit the questions of
infringement and validity.2 8 7 To demonstrate its thoroughness this time, the lower
court issued an unpublished 99 page slip opinion that outlined in excruciating detail
all the ways in which it believed that Bayer representatives had intentionally
deceived the USPTO.2 88 Introduced in this opinion was an additional focus on Dr.
Mariani and her notes. Jansens still figured prominently in the narrative, but
278 Id. at *32-34.
279 Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience, N.V., 264 F. Supp. 2d 852, 853 (E.D. Mo. 2002)
[hereinafter Monsanto 1, revd, 363 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
280 See id. at 855-57.
281 See generally Monsanto I, No. 4:00CV01915 ERW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97254 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 28, 2006) (discussing Bayer's conduct in light of the Barnes Poster/Abstract), affd, 514 F.3d
1229 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
282 Monsanto 1 264 F. Supp. 2d at 862; Aventis Cropscience, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27417, at
*6-8, *32-34 (referring to Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 246
(D. Conn. 2001), afld, 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
283 Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience, N.V., 363 F.3d 1235, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2004) [hereinafter
Monsanto 1].
284 Id. at 1242.
285 Monsanto -I, 514 F.3d 1229, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Monsanto I, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97254, at *154. Bayer's strategy seemed to be to focus on the '565 Patent because it was the only
one in which Jansens' USPTO declaration and later discredited affidavits to the court were not
implicated. See Monsanto I, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97254, at *155. In fact, Bayer sought and
obtained a ruling from the court that Jansens' actions would not be considered to "infect" the '565
Patent's prosecution. Id. at *154.
286 See id.; Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or
more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered
unenforceable.").287 Monsanto Il 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97254, at *160-70.
288 See generallyid (outlining the court's determination of Bayer's inequitable conduct).
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because his actions were limited to the '799 Patent, '372 Patent, and '546 Patent, the
Mariani evidence was central to the court's finding of specific facts that showed
inequitable conduct with regard to the '565 Patent.28 9
Bayer appealed again, this time on two grounds: a) the lower court improperly
found inequitable conduct with regard to the '565 Patent; and ii) the lower court did
not have jurisdiction to find the other patents unenforceable once they were
dismissed by Bayer for its infringement claims. 290 Bayer did not appeal the findings
on inequitable conduct with regard to these other patents, perhaps because of the
lower court's damning statements about Jansens' and other Bayer representatives'
actions with regard to their prosecution.291 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reviewed
only the Mariani evidence and the '565 Patent inequitable conduct findings on their
merits, while reviewing the inequitable conduct rulings on the other patents purely
on jurisdictional grounds ("Monsanto JJ).292
The court relied on its own precedent in Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania Products,
Inc.,293 to hold that the lower court had jurisdiction to hold the dismissed patents
unenforceable for inequitable conduct.2 94 In Nilssen, the court held that four patents
which had been withdrawn from an infringement suit by the patentee plaintiff just
before trial started were still properly within the lower court's jurisdiction for
purposes of inequitable conduct findings.295  First, some of the patents were
substantially linked to other patents still at issue, and so the Federal Circuit
asserted that where inequitable conduct with regard to some patent applications
could "infect" related applications, then the patents that were at the center of the
possibly inequitable activities would of necessity need to be examined for inequitable
conduct prior to resolution of that issue for the other related patents.2 96 It is not
clear whether the Nilssen court would have gone so far to say that a court could use
its inherent equitable powers to pull into the suit patents that were never invoked by
either the plaintiff or defendant. That would seem draconian and unwarranted. In
the suit at hand, however, the patentee plaintiff had originally asserted the four
patents and withdrew them "only shortly before trial at the last minute."297
Accordingly, the court may also have been attempting to discourage patentee
plaintiffs from playing fast and loose with the patents they assert, all contingent on
which ones seem to get the most traction during the proceedings and which ones may
be too susceptible to being ruled unenforceable for inequitable conduct. Alternately,
there may be an underlying principle that once a patentee plaintiff opens the door
and puts a patent into play, it cannot simply withdraw it when things do not go well.
Back to the facts at issue in Monsanto II, Bayer argued that the prosecution of
the '565 Patent was completely cabined from the prosecution of the other withdrawn
patents such that Jansens' activities could not have "infected" the '565 Patent and
289 Id. at *155, *166-69.
290 See MonsantoI, 514 F.3d 1229, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
291 See Monsanto I, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97254, at *86 ("Mr. Jansens is not skillful in his
attempts to manipulate the truth before this Court.").
292 Monsanto II, 514 F.3d at 1231.
293 504 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
294 Monsanto I, 514 F.3d at 1243.
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thus there were no grounds for the lower court to consider them for inequitable
conduct on the way to determining that issue for the '565 Patent which remained in
play.2 98 While both the lower court and the Federal Circuit essentially agreed that
Jansens' activities with regard to the other patents could not have infected the '565
Patent, the Federal Circuit upheld the lower court's jurisdiction over the other
patents on the basis that Monsanto had filed a motion for attorneys fees under 35
U.S.C. § 285, based on inequitable activities with regard to the other patents before
they were withdrawn by Bayer.2 99 Thus, while inequitable conduct still seems to
have no standing as an independently actionable claim, it can be kept alive through
either the "infectious inequitable conduct" theory or a motion for attorneys fees so
long as those were instituted at any time while the patents were being asserted in
litigation by the patentee. 300 In other words, once a patentee has put any patents
into play in litigation proceedings, it may not be able to withdraw them entirely for
purposes of inequitable conduct findings. Further, in discussing Nlssen, the
Monsanto II court also asserted in dicta that a court is compelled by law to declare
patents unenforceable whenever it makes a finding on inequitable conduct. 30 1 Thus,
in Nilssen where the findings of inequitable conduct on the withdrawn patents were
arguably done only as a collateral matter, the simple fact that they were properly
and necessarily done still compelled the court to enter a ruling of unenforceability. 30 2
The focus on Monsanto IIby practitioners and commentators, however, has been
overwhelmingly on the nature of the Mariani evidence and notes.303 But this only
first appeared in the lower court's remand opinion.30 4 Further, because Bayer did not
dispute the lower court's findings of inequitable conduct with regard to the '799
Patent, '372 Patent, and '546 Patent, but rather contested only whether the lower
court had jurisdiction to make these findings and/or hold the patent unenforceable,
once the Federal Circuit decided the jurisdictional issue as a matter of law, there was
no need to review the Jansens evidence. 305 Accordingly, this led to the somewhat odd
result that the two Federal Circuit appeals in the case discuss different characters
and specific events. Mariani's notes appear nowhere in Monsanto I, while Jansens'
298 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Bayer Bioscience at 24-27, Monsanto I, No. 2007-1109
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 8, 2007). For the reapolitikobserver, it may be interesting to read the 99 page lower
court slip opinion in which Judge Webber excoriates Jansens and other Bayer representatives. See
generally Monsanto I, No. 4:00-cv-01915-ERW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97254 (E.D. Mo. August 28,
2006), affd, 514 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing Jansens and other Bayer representatives
conduct). Judge Webber asserts that Jansens not only intentionally deceived the USPTO but that
as a witness Jansens was also lying to and trying to deceive the court. E.g., id at *61 ("Mr. Jansens
is evasive and is not a believable witness."). Accordingly, Judge Webber may have been more
inclined to do everything in his power to keep Jansens' misdeeds in the record, even though
arguably the activities should have been moot once Bayer withdrew those patents from its
infringement claims. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
815-16 (1945) (describing what would become the inequitable conduct defense to infringement).
299 Monsanto I, 514 F.3d at 1242.
300 See id.
301 Id. at 1243.
302 Nilssen, 504 F.3d at 1233.
303 See, e.g., Gerald Sobel, Reconsidering the Scope of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine in
View of Supreme Court Precedent and Patent Policy, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 169, 180-81 (2008).
304 See generally Monsanto I1 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97254 (discussing Bayer's conduct in
light of the Mariani evidence and notes).
305 MonsantoI, 514 F.3d at 1243, 1243 n.18.
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shenanigans appear nowhere in Monsanto 11306 Further since the lynchpin 99 page
lower court slip opinion on remand is unpublished and was only available through
PACER until recently, it seems to have only been publicly discussed by the Federal
Circuit in Monsanto II itself.307 But this discussion concerns only the Mariani
evidence and the reader is thus left to her own devices to determine how the focus
shifted from exclusively on Jansens to exclusively on Mariani. However, a review of
the lower court opinion, as done for this Article and summarized above, makes clear
how this transition occurred.
In reviewing the lower court's findings with regard to unenforceability of the
'565 Patent on the basis of inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit noted that Bayer
had to argue around office action rejections during prosecution based both on
obviousness from inter alia the Barnes Abstract and lack of enablement due to the
unpredictability of the art coupled with Bayer's failure to show why their claims
would work.308 Bayer was able to do so based on the limited disclosure in the Barnes
Abstract, but would have faced a far greater challenge if the Barnes Poster as
detailed in Mariani's notes were before the examiner. 309 While Bayer's patent
attorney knew of Mariani's notes and had discussed them with her
contemporaneously with the prosecution, he later claimed that Mariani was unable
to remember "anything' about the presentation or poster during their discussion. 310
However, she demonstrated a clear command and recollection of the Barnes Poster
and presentation when stepping through her notes during deposition.311 At trial,
Mariani suddenly could not remember the detail of her notes or the Barnes Poster
and presentation, which both the district court and Federal Circuit found highly
suspect. 312 Bayer's patent attorney was similarly not credible in his testimony about
why he failed to disclose the details of the Barnes Poster or Mariani's notes about it,
especially given that it was admitted that Mariani's notes had circulated widely in
Bayer's Bt group. 313
In May 2008, the Federal Circuit decided the fourth-and for now last-of its
recent controversial inequitable conduct decisions in Aventis Pharma S.A. v.
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 314 The case centered on patents covering the drug
Lovenox owned by Aventis. 315 Amphastar and Teva Pharmaceuticals both filed
Abbreviated New Drug Applications ("ANDAs") with Paragraph IV certifications,
under the FDA's rules promulgated under the Hatch-Waxman Act, to challenge
Aventis' patents and begin marketing a generic of Lovenox before the patents
expired. 316 Aventis sued both companies and Amphastar filed for summary judgment
306 Compare generally Monsanto 1 363 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (lacking reference to Dr,
Mariani's highly material notes), with Monsanto II, 514 F.3d at 1242 (lacking reference to Jansens'
falsified documentation).
307 See generally Monsanto I1 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97254 (discussing the lower court
opinion).
308 Monsanto I, 514 F.3d at 1234-35.
309 Id. at 1235-40.
310 Id. at 1236.
311 Id. at 1235-36.
312 Id. at 1236 n.10.
313 Id. at 1236, 1241.
314 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
315 Id. at 1337-38.
316 Id. at 1340.
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on an inequitable conduct defense, averring that Dr. Uzan, Aventis' science expert
whose affidavits were relied on to overcome the examiner's objections during
prosecution, had compared the half lives of the compared compounds at different
doses, as part of Aventis' intent to deceive the USPTO.317 The court granted the
motion and Aventis appealed a first time.318 In that appeal, the Federal Circuit
found that the withheld information was material, but that there was insufficient
evidence to find intent to deceive on summary judgment.319 Accordingly, the
summary judgment decision was reversed and the case remanded back to the district
court. 320 After a bench trial, the district court found no credible explanation for Dr.
Uzan's failure to clearly disclose the different doses used for the half-life comparisons
and found the requisite intent to deceive to rule that the patents were unenforceable
for inequitable conduct.321
On the second appeal that led to the instant decision, Aventis apparently
changed its explanation as to why Dr. Uzan failed to disclose the dosage information
in his half-life comparisons. 322 They were to show a difference in properties to
overcome a section 103 rejection, rather than to demonstrate a compositional
difference to overcome the section 102 rejection. 323 This was followed by Aventis'
assertions that while a half-life comparison must be done at the same dosage to
establish a compositional difference, a half-life comparison can be done at different
dosages to establish a difference in properties. 324 In fact, Aventis claimed that it was
more appropriate to use the "clinically relevant dose" for each compound in the half
life comparison. 325 However, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had
adequately determined that Dr. Uzan's submissions were intended to counter both
anticipation and obviousness rejections through showing differences in both
properties and composition of the compounds. 326 As such, the district court had not
clearly erred in its determinations. 327 Aventis further argued that the district court
erred in excluding evidence of industry practice to compare drugs at their clinically
relevant dosages. 328 However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
findings on this because Aventis had conceded that half-life comparisons must be
done at the same dose to show compositional differences, and the district court found
that Aventis was intending at least in part to show compositional differences to
address the anticipation rejection. 329 The Federal Circuit also relied on the district
court's findings that it was incredible that Dr. Uzan had picked these particular
317 Id. at 1341 (citing Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 936,
938-39 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).
318 Id. (citing Aventis Pharma, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 952).
319 Id. at 1342 (citing Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 176 F. App'x 117, 122
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (unpublished table decision)).
320 Id. (citing Aventis Pharma, 176 F. App'x at 123).
321 Id. at 1343 (citing Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 970,
994 (C.D. Cal. 2007)).




326 Id. at 1345.
327 Id.
328 Id. at 1347.
329 Id.
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doses as the clinically relevant ones because the composition could be used at several
different doses for different indications and there was no evidence that he had picked
the 40 mg dose tested due to its efficacy for one particular indication over the
others.330 Evidence of industry practice would have no impact on the court's
credibility determination. 331
Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed other arguments that Aventis made on
appeal, including Dr. Uzan's own exculpatory statements. 332 Ultimately, the Federal
Circuit was satisfied that the district court had weighed the evidence for and against
an intent to deceive and did not clearly err in finding on balance more evidence
pointing to an intent to deceive than away from such a conclusion.333 Aventis also
argued that Dr. Uzan did disclose the data, but the Federal Circuit found that the
district court did not clearly err in finding that the disclosure was done at best in a
very misleading way. 334 Finally, Aventis argued that Dr. Uzan failed to disclose the
use of different doses based purely on inadvertence. 335 However, again the Federal
Circuit refused to find that the district court had clearly erred in its
determinations. 336
Judge Rader issued a strong dissent in the case.337 In a quotable line, he stated
that "[t]he threat of inequitable conduct, with its 'atomic bomb' remedy of
unenforceability, ensures.., candor and truthfulness." 338 His main concern was that
the court may be moving too far from case law that he interprets to "restrictl a
finding of inequitable conduct to only the most extreme cases of fraud and
deception."339 Judge Newman has expressed concern with the possible fragmenting
of the 65ingsdown consensus, as discussed above, and so she and Judge Rader may
represent at least a minority block that wishes to preserve that consensus and feels
that it is currently in danger.340
It is unclear where the other members of the court stand. A possible, but merely
speculative, inference is that those members of the court who are involved in the
majority decision on some of the controversial cases-such as Judges Prost and
Moore in Aventis, and Clevenger and Bryson in McKesson-are not troubled by the
direction the court appears to be headed on the proper scope of a finding of intent to
deceive. 341 But, their actual decisions in these cases could mean a number of things.
They could feel that Aventis and McKesson, respectively, do adhere to the J'ingsdown
consensus, and thus that the court is not moving in any new direction. Or they could
feel that the particular facts of Aventis or McKesson are not covered by the
ingsdown consensus. After all, the ingsdown consensus really focused only on
330 Id. at 1347-48.
331 Id. at 1348.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 1348-49.
335 Id. at 1349.
336 Id.
337 Id. (Rader, J., dissenting).
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 See supra notes 337-339 and accompanying text; see also McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v.
Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting) (warning of a
"return[] to the 'plague' of encouraging unwarranted charges of inequitable conduct").
341 See McKesson, 487 F.3d at 901; Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1337.
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whether a finding of gross negligence could in and of itself justify an inference of an
intent to deceive. 342 It held that the mere finding of gross negligence did not sustain
such an inference. 343 But the court also held, as discussed above, that the ultimate
decision of whether inequitable conduct occurred was a question of equity to be
determined at the district court judge's discretion (just as a question of law would be
decided)3 44 Further, given the sliding scale of materiality and intent to a finding of
inequitable conduct, a judge's findings on the matter of intent to deceive can be fairly
low if her findings on materiality are high.345 Thus, the If'ngsdown consensus
statement does not say that gross negligence can never be the basis for a sufficient
finding of intent to deceive, only that it is not in and of itself sufficient (i.e., it is
dependent on the materiality findings-high materiality may render gross negligence
sufficient for intent to deceive).346 In the alternative, the majority decisions in
Aventis and McKesson could signal a dissatisfaction with the J'ingsdown consensus.
Of course, to the extent any judges are unhappy with the consensus, they are
nonetheless bound by it until or unless the full court revisits it en banc.347
As time has moved on, however, it seems that some of these recent cases may
have been over interpreted by the commentators and practitioners who promote a
"disclose everything" mentality. Whatever trend Dayco, McKesson, Monsanto, and
Aventis may suggest towards an increase in the Federal Circuit's receptivity to
inequitable conduct cases, the court's decisions since then strongly indicate that
these cases may instead be aberrations. Following Aventis throughout the
remainder of 2008, the Federal Circuit decided 17 appeals that included review of an
inequitable conduct defense. In 11 of these, the court affirmed the district court's
finding of no inequitable conduct.3 48 In four others, the court reversed or vacated a
342 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 See Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("The more material the omission or misrepresentation, the lower the level of intent required
to establish inequitable conduct, and vice versa." (citing Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808
F.2d 1471, 1481-82 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1481-82 ("Materiality and intent must also
be considered together: the more material the omission or misrepresentation, the less intent that
must be shown to reach a conclusion of inequitable conduct." (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v.
Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); Am. Hoist & Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1363
("Questions of 'materiality' and 'culpability' are often interrelated and intertwined, so that a lesser
showing of the materiality of the withheld information may suffice when an intentional scheme to
defraud is established, whereas a greater showing of the materiality of withheld information would
necessarily create an inference that its nondisclosure was 'wrongful."' (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 716 (1st Cir. 1981))).
346 Kiangsdown, 863 F.2d at 876 ("We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct
amounts to 'gross negligence' does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive . ).
347 See id. at 876 n.16.
348 See Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp., 550 F.3d 1112, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Abbott Labs. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d
1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Symantec Corp. v.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v.
Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 518
F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Erico Int'l Corp. v. Vutec Corp., 516 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Black & Decker, Inc.
v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 F. App'x 284, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (unpublished table decision).
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lower court finding of inequitable conduct.349 In an additional case, the court
affirmed a district court's finding of no inequitable conduct in part, related to some of
the claims of one of the two patents-in-suit; but reversed and remanded in part based
on the district court's ruling that the inequitable conduct inquiry was moot because
the remaining claims in the patents-in-suit were invalid or non infringed (the
Federal Circuit ruled that the issue was not moot as it was raised as a valid
counterclaim).350 This left only one remaining case in 2008 following Aventis in
which the Federal Circuit upheld a district court's finding of inequitable conduct.
And even in that case-Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, InC.35 1-one panel member, Judge
Lourie, dissented and would have reversed the finding of inequitable conduct.35 2 At
the same time, the majority affirmed the finding of inequitable conduct only because
the withheld information was highly material, the inventor and attorney knew it was
material, and had no explanation for why they withheld it. 3 5 3
Through July 2009, there were five inequitable conduct cases at the Federal
Circuit and none of them affirmed a finding of inequitable conduct.354 In Rothman v.
Target Corp., the court reversed the district court's finding of inequitable conduct,
even as it affirmed the district court's finding of patent invalidity. 355 In Larson
Manufacturing Company of South Dakota, Inc. v. Aluminart Products Ltd., the court
vacated the district court's dismissal of the patent infringement case that was based
on finding of inequitable conduct. 356 The Federal Circuit found that while the district
court had properly found two undisclosed office actions in a continuation application
to be material, the district court's findings that three undisclosed prior art references
were not cumulative-and hence material-was clearly erroneous. 35 7  However,
because the district court had made a finding of intent to deceive collectively across
both the office actions and prior art references, with no distinction between them, the
Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for the district court to: i) determine whether
there was specific intent to deceive on the office actions alone; and ii) balance the
intent, if any, with the materiality of the office actions to make a finding as to
whether a sufficient level of inequitable conduct had occurred to hold the patent
unenforceable. 35 8 In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Federal
349 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 536 F.3d 1247, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Scanner Techs.
Corp. v. Icos Vision Sys. Corp., 528 F.3d 1365, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008); TALtech Ltd. v. Esquel
Apparel, Inc., 279 F. App'x 974, 975 (Fed. Cr. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision).
350 Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc'n Sys., 522 F.3d 1348, 1366-68 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
351 Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
352 Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
353 Id. at 1318.
354 Wavetronix v. EIS Elec. Integrated Sys., 573 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Ariad
Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cr. 2009); Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v.
Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rothman v. Target Corp., 556 F.3d
1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Dickson Indus., Inc. v. Patent Enforcement Team, L.L.C., Nos. 2008-
1372, 2008-1398, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10779, at *2 (Fed. Cir. May 20, 2009). The Article is not
covering Walker Process antitrust based inequitable conduct claims that allege fraudulent
procurement for purposes of anticompetitive activities. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176 (1965).
355 556 F.3d at 1313-14.
356 559 F.3d at 1320, 1342.
357 Id.
358 Id. at 1342.
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Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the patent-in-suit was not
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. 35 9 In Dickson Industries, Inc. v. Patent
Enforcement Team, L.L.C, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a finding of
unenforceability for inequitable conduct because the lower court issued contradictory
rulings with regard to whether alleged inequitable conduct in a reexamination
proceeding that occurred at the USPTO while the case was pending would even be
allowed in to the suit.36 0 Over the patent owner's protests because it had not been
given adequate time and notice to litigate the issue, the lower court ultimately
allowed the issue in anyway. 361 The Federal Circuit held that this clearly prejudiced
the case against the patent owner. Judge Rader, writing the opinion, reminded the
lower court and parties that:
This court has long recognized that "the habit of charging inequitable
conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague."
Given the severe consequences of unenforceability when it is imposed on a
patent, it is paramount that the district court exercise necessary caution to
ensure that the patent owner met its burden of proof with respect to both
the materiality and deceptive intent.362
In Wavetronix v. EIS Electronic Integrated Systems, the Federal Circuit upheld the
lower court's dismissal of an inequitable conduct defense on summary judgment with
little fanfare.363
Then, on August 4, 2009, the Federal Circuit appeared to take direct aim at the
perceived abuses of the inequitable conduct doctrine by ruling in Exergen Corp. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. that the heightened pleading requirement under Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 36 4 should be interpreted to "require[]
identification of the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material
misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO."365 This holding
specifically adopted the "newspaper analogy" interpretation of the requirements of
Rule 9(b) employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young.366 Further, even though Rule 9(b) requires pleading with
particularity only for the circumstances constituting the fraud, the court noted that
"[a]lthough 'knowledge' and 'intent' may be averred generally, our precedent, like
that of several regional circuits, requires that the pleadings allege sufficient
underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer that a party acted with the
requisite state of mind."367 Applying these interpretations of Rule 9(b) to the lower
court's factual record and refusal to grant leave for the defendant to amend its
359 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
360 Nos. 2008-1372, 2008-1398, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10779, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. May, 20 2009).
361 Id. at *11-12.
362 Id. at *13 (citations omitted).
363 573 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
364 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person's mind may be alleged generally.").
365 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
366 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
367 Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327.
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answer to add a defense of inequitable conduct, the Exergen court affirmed the lower
court on the basis that the defendant's proposed amendment was too vague as to the
important particulars of the "who, what, when, where, and how" of the alleged
inequitable conduct. 368
Following Exergen, the Federal Circuit declined to allow a patent infringement
defendant to raise an inequitable conduct defense on remand in the lower court in
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.369 However, this ruling turned
largely on technical or procedural matters. 370  First, some of the categories of
inequitable conduct arguments were raised and either abandoned or rejected by the
jury in the earlier proceeding before remand. 371 Second, the parties had stipulated to
exclude allegations of inequitable conduct based on the actions of one of the experts,
which constituted the remaining category of inequitable conduct arguments. 372
Wrapping up the month of August, the Federal Circuit also ruled on inequitable
conduct in a trademark case, In re Bose.373 While not directly on point for the
doctrine of inequitable conduct in patent cases, Judge Michel, writing for the court,
cited patent inequitable conduct cases such as J'ingsdown and Star Scientific, Inc. v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. to establish the Federal Circuit's position on inequitable
conduct generally.374 The court then reversed the Trademark Trial And Appeal
Board's ("TTAB") ruling that a lawyer for Bose engaged in inequitable conduct when
he submitted a Section 8 affidavit of continued use to support a Section 9 renewal
application that stated Bose was still using the WAVE mark in commerce on audio
tape recorders and players, even though the lawyer knew that Bose had stopped
selling such units at the time of the renewal. 375 The lawyer claimed that he believed
that because Bose was still servicing such units, and then shipping them back to
customers, such use constituted continued commercial use for purposes of the Section
8 affidavit and Section 9 renewal application.376 While this is inaccurate, and thus
the Federal Circuit agreed with the TTAB that the lawyer made a material
misrepresentation to the USPTO, the court nonetheless reversed the finding of
inequitable conduct because "t]here is no fraud if a false representation is occasioned
by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to
deceive." 377 The court even went so far as to sidestep the TTAB's finding that the
lawyer's stated belief was unreasonable by stating that it did "not need to resolve the
issue of the reasonableness as it is not part of the analysis."378 This is fascinating
though, as the Federal Circuit found an unreasonable judgment on the part of the
patent attorney in Paragon to be quite relevant to the ultimate finding that the
attorney had acted with intent to deceive the USPTO. 379
368 Id. at 1327, 1329.
369 576 F.3d 1348, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
370 Id. at 1351.
371 Id. at 1353.
372 Id. at 1357-58.
373 580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
374 Id. at 1244-45. See 537 F.3d 1357 (2008); 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).




379 Paragon Podiatry Lab. Inc. v. KLM Labs. Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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In September, the Federal Circuit issued two orders involving inequitable
conduct, both of which allowed inequitable conduct proceedings to continue in the
respective lower courts, and then issued two opinions affirming lower courts' findings
of no inequitable conduct. 380 The two orders allowing inequitable conduct inquiries to
continue were merely procedural and technical rulings, however.38' In National
Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Pason Systems USA Corp, the Federal Circuit found that the
lower court's attempt to issue a final Rule 54(b) judgment on validity and
infringement of the patent was improper because the district court had bifurcated the
proceeding and not yet resolved the inequitable conduct portion. 38 2 In Revolution
Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., the Federal Circuit decided to vacate part of an
earlier order denying Aspex' motion for attorney's fees based on its inequitable
conduct claims, because the Federal Circuit had separately reversed the lower court's
dismissal of Aspex' unenforceability counterclaim. 383
The first September opinion affirming a finding of no inequitable conduct was
Vita -Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc.38 4 Similar to the facts of Bose, the facts in this
case were that a false statement was made to the USPTO. In the instant case, it was
one of the inventors who made a statement to show patentability by distinguishing
the prior art that was clearly refuted by another reference in the prior art.38 5
However, the inventor denied any intention to deceive the USPTO by asserting that
regardless of the actual falsity of the statement, he believed it to be true at the time
he made it to the USPTO.386 Because the infringement defendant placed no other
evidence in the record from which the district court could properly infer an intent to
deceive, it rejected the inequitable conduct claim. 38 7 The Federal Circuit affirmed
both the finding and the rationale.
The second September opinion was Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.388  Infringement defendant Teva alleged that
Astrazeneca's representatives attempted to deceive the USPTO when they failed to
submit certain data on drug molecules with some structural similarity to the
molecule for which patent protection was sought.38 9 However, the record showed that
Astrazeneca disclosed all the similar molecules and worked with the examiner to
determine which ones were truly close enough to the target molecule to require the
submission of data. 390 Once that decision was made, then Astrazeneca dutifully
submitted data on those molecules. The district court found no intent to deceive by
Astrazeneca when it thus elected not to generate and submit new data that the
380 See Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Astrazeneca
Pharma., LP v. Teva Pharma. USA Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 777 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
381 See National Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., Nos. 2009-1397, 2009-1398, 2009
WL 2903595 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., Nos. 2008-1185,
2008-1238, 2009 WL 2903592 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
382 Nos. 2009-1397, 2009-1398, 2009 WL 2903595 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
383 Nos. 2008-1185, 2008-1238, 2009 WL 2903592 (Fed. Cr. 2009).
384 581 F.3d 1317, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
385 Id. at 1323.
386 Id. at 1332.
387 Id.
388 583 F. 3d 766 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
389 Id. at 770.
390 Id.
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examiner had not requested.3 9 1 The Federal Circuit again affirmed both the finding
and the rationale of the lower court.8 92
These recent cases seem to show an effort on the part of the Federal Circuit to
once again try to rein in the use of the inequitable conduct doctrine. However, like
the lingsdown "solution," they only address specific tactics within the broader set of
uses of the doctrine and thus do less than they may originally appear to do. In some
ways, cases like J'ingsdown and Exergen are more successful as signals from the
court that it frowns upon widespread use of the inequitable conduct doctrine at given
points in time. But neither really breaks new ground or creates new law-primarily
because the court is still hemmed in by Precision Instrument and thus cannot
materially alter the basic doctrine.3 93 Therefore, any relief felt by patentees and
their attorneys after Exergen is probably ill-advised and may be short-lived.
In sum, despite some recent troubling rulings, the overall case law covering
inequitable conduct is still in line with what has developed in the long lineage from
the first and last Supreme Court word on the matter in Precision Instruments. 394
That is the good news. The bad news is that this lineage of case law is sprawling
and permits multiple tests for materiality and intent, as well as a sliding inverse
scale of materiality and intent that judges must equitably weigh before ultimately
determining whether inequitable conduct has occurred. In the Federal Circuit
decision on the USPTO's Final Rules on continuations et a]., Tafas v. Do], the panel
reasserted its position that the doctrine of inequitable conduct is first and foremost a
judicial equitable doctrine: "The reach of inequitable conduct is solely within the
control of the courts . . . ."395 The court was responding to some amici arguments that
the requirement for an examination support document (ESD) in the case of applicant
submissions of more than five independent claims or twenty-five total claims "is so
wrought with peril that sane applicants will be absolutely limited to five independent
claims and twenty-five total claims" because "even the most diligently prepared ESD
will inevitably open the applicant to inequitable conduct allegations that will entail
costly litigation and a possible finding of unenforceability." 396 The court declined to
make a ruling based on these arguments because "this concern is too speculative to
void the rules and, in any event, is at its core a matter of inequitable conduct
doctrine, not USPTO rulemaking authority."397
Finally, a new patent reform bill-the Patent Reform Act of 2009 39 8-has been
introduced in Congress and may have a substantial chance of passing given the
Democrats majority and President Obama's stated support for patent reform. 399 As it
391 Id.
392 Id. at 777.
393 See, e.g., Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328-29, 1330-31 (requiring claims of inequitable conduct be
plead with particularity while noting that deceptive intent was only plead upon information and
belief and SAAT did not provide information or belief for the claim).
394 See discussion, supra Part II.




398 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R.
1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (introduced simultaneously in the Senate as S. 515).
399 See George Best et al., United States: The Obama Administration Weighs In On Patent
Reform Legislation: Will The Logam Break MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Oct. 14, 2009.
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currently stands, the bill refrains from codifying the inequitable conduct defense as
some have called for. This could change as the bill evolves over time. Absent a
statutory codification of inequitable conduct, or a definitive new Supreme Court
ruling, however, the doctrine will continue to be defined as a threshold matter by
Rule 56, but this is a floor not a ceiling. Courts are still free to find inequitable
conduct even where an applicant and her patent attorneys/agents have complied with
all aspects of Rule 56 and the IDS Rules. 400 In other words, compliance with Rule 56
and the IDS Rules is necessary, but not sufficient, to avoid a finding of inequitable
conduct rendering a client's patents unenforceable. At the same time, the Federal
Circuit has done a decent job of cabining the doctrine to one in which courts must
assess baseline levels of materiality and intent, balance them, and then determine if
inequitable conduct has occurred at such a level as to warrant withholding its
equitable powers on behalf of the patentee-plaintiff. 40 1 The final Part of this Article
provides suggestions for disclosures to the USPTO during patent prosecution to
minimize adverse findings of inequitable conduct in later litigation as well as
theorizes a tactic to cut off use of the defense in the first place.
III. SUGGESTIONS TO ESTABLISH AN INEQUITABLE CONDUCT RESISTANT PROSECUTION
HISTORY AND A PROPOSED LITIGATION TACTIC TO CUT OFF USE OF THE DEFENSE
While many law firms rushed to set new policies for significantly increased
disclosure in their IDS practice-as if the doctrine of inequitable conduct has actually
changed-they may be over reading the cases and actually risking inequitable
conduct through excessive disclosure to the USPTO. 402  As has been shown
throughout this Article, the doctrine of inequitable conduct has not changed in any
material way, even with the controversial decisions of Dayco, Monsanto, McKesson,
and Aventis, and including the newer cases such as Exergen that seem to be steering
parties away from raising inequitable conduct claims unless the conduct is egregious.
The controlling Supreme Court decision is still Precision Instruments, and the
inquiry is still a sliding inverse scale of materiality and intent once the threshold
levels of materiality and intent are found. 40 3 The multiple tests developed by the
courts and the USPTO are still valid.40 4 The only new information provided by recent
decisions is a highlighting of some types of evidence that the courts might consider
persuasive in considering questions of materiality and intent. 405
However, it is a mistake to read these cases too broadly for the import of these
types of evidence, especially when patent attorneys are considering whether or how
to amend or clarify their IDS practice.406 Creating new classes of "mandatory"
disclosures at too broad a level of generality-e.g., all office actions in a related
400 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945)
(describing the court's "wide range" of discretion in equity regarding inequitable conduct).
401 See discussion supra Part II.
402 See discussion supra Part II.
403 See discussion supra Part II.
404 See discussion supra Part II.
405 See discussion supra Part II.
406 See, e.g., COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP, PUBLIC ANTICIPATES NEW PATENT OFFICE
RULES FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS 2-3 (2008), http://www.cooley.com/58627.
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family of applications-may well overburden the USPTO and risk inequitable
conduct on the grounds of burying the material documents. While the USPTO and
inequitable conduct doctrine expressly allow the submission of immaterial documents
to the USPTO, this is merely to create a buffer zone so that inventors and their
attorneys do not have to worry about submitting in good faith documents that the
examiner later finds to be immaterial.40 7 But this buffer zone is cabined by the
prohibition on burying material references in a broad "document dump" disclosure. 408
Accordingly, there is no easy "bright line" response to the recent inequitable
disclosure cases (e.g., "disclose all office actions"). Rather the inventor and her
attorney must continue to evaluate references and make a reasonable judgment as to
whether they are material enough to require disclosure to the examiner. 40 9 The first
section below outlines ways for patent attorneys to evaluate references in light of the
recent cases on inequitable conduct. The second section theorizes the pleading of
damages-only claims to cut off inequitable conduct defenses as a species of unclean
hands equitable doctrine.
A. Evaluating References for Possible Disclosure
1. Materialty
Materiality is not a binary state. References may be more or less material.
Thus the sliding scale between materiality and intent is not varying so much as to
the strength of the evidence for or against materiality, but rather as to the degree of
materiality the reference possesses with regard to the application at issue.4 10
Materiality may be assessed by five different standards: i) the current Rule 56 and
IDS Rules; ii) the reasonable examiner test (the old 1977 Rule standard); iii) the
objective "but for" test; iv) the subjective "but for" test; and v) the "but it might have
been important to the examiner" test. 411 This Article does not purport to address all
issues of materiality from the ground up. Rather, it focuses on materiality issues
raised by the recent Federal Circuit case law.
This Article proposes the perhaps trivial or obvious initial step that patent
attorneys triage all references they are aware of into something similar to the
following three categories: i) clearly material; ii) possibly material; and iii) clearly
immaterial. Clearly material references will be submitted individually or as part of
407 See Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2,021, 2,024 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
pts. 1 & 10) ("Presumably, applicants will continue to submit information for consideration by the
Office in applications rather than making and relying on their own determinations of materiality.").
408 See, e.g., Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 948, 964-65 (S.D. Fla.
1972), affd, 479 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming district court's finding of inequitable conduct
based on a patentee's burying of a highly material reference).
409 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2008).
410 See, e.g., Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (describing a scale of materiality in determining the relevance of a reference).
411 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 ("Duty to disclose information material to patentability."); id. §§ 1.97-1.98
("Filing of information disclosure statement" and "Content of information disclosure statement.");
Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5,588, 5,593 (Jan. 28, 1977) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (setting forth "reasonable examiner" standard); Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (setting forth subjective "but for" test; describing objective "but for" test).
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an IDS. 412 The only remaining question for this type of reference is how, if at all, to
summarize or describe the references. Because the manner in which a reference is
submitted plays a large role in findings of intent, the full discussion of the disclosure
content and format is left for the next subsection. Clearly immaterial references may
be withheld.413  However, it is recommended that attorneys include in the
prosecution file some notes or means to remind themselves of why they decided that
the reference was clearly immaterial. This is because in many of the cases where a
finding of inequitable conduct has been upheld by the Federal Circuit-even with a
low finding of actual or circumstantial intent-it was because the patent attorney
was unable to recall or explain why he withheld the reference in good faith.414 Intent
will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection.415
The most difficult category is that of references that are possibly material. The
discussion that follows is limited to the types of possibly material references that
have caused concern in recent Federal Circuit case law.
a. Co-Pen hngApplications and Office Actions
In co-pending applications before the same examiner or different examiners, in
which identical or substantially similar claims are being prosecuted, the attorney
should treat all office actions that question or reject the identical or substantially
similar claims as material for all the co-pending applications.416 Further, allowances
of claims in co-pending applications that are substantially similar enough that they
could give rise to a claim of double patenting if the instant claims are also allowed,
should also be deemed material and disclosed to the examiner. 417 This is different
from some law firm and commentator suggestions to simply cite all office actions in
all co-pending applications. 418 If the office action in a co-pending application is
limited to a claim that is dissimilar to any of the claims in co-pending related family
applications, then it is hard to see how this is material to the other applications, and
no Federal Circuit decision requires this. Of course, judgment is still required and if
an office action in a co-pending application covering the same or similar subject
matter questions the patentability of the invention and application at issue, then
that may be material as well. 419
412 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56, 1.97-1.98.
413 See Penn Yan Boats, 359 F. Supp. at 964-65 (finding inequitable conduct based on a
patentee's burying of a highly material reference).
414 See discussion inira Part IJ.A.2.
415 See discussion infra Part IJ.A.2.
416 See discussion supra Part II (particularly the discussion of McKesson).
417 See discussion supra Part II; 35 U.S.C. 101 (2006) (limiting patents to only "new"
inventions); MPEP, supra note 68, § 804 II.
418 See, e.g, Tom Brody, Duty to Disclose: Dayco Products v. Total Containment, 7 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 342 (2008).
419 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2008) ("The duty to disclose [material] information exists with respect to
each pending claim until the claim is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the application
becomes abandoned."); MPEP, supra note 68, § 2004.09 (cautioning attorney/agents to "not rely on
the examiner of a particular application to be aware of other applications belonging to the same
applicant or assignee").
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At the same time, it must be emphasized that simply because a co-pending
application is before the same examiner does not mean that the prosecuting attorney
can rely on the examiner's familiarity with the content or actions taken in that co-
pending application when examining the instant application.420 This does raise some
fairness and relative work load questions for the prosecuting attorney-e.g., why
does the examiner have the right to essentially demand that every material reference
be placed by the prosecuting attorney under his nose at the moment he examines the
application, including those references created by the examiner himself in co-pending
applications-but this Article reflects the case law as it is and not as it should be.
A Notes and Other Informal Materials Within the Inventor's Organization
While patent attorneys still need not ask their clients' inventors, or the
inventor's organization, to search for possibly relevant references within the inventor
or organization's records, any relevant records, notes, or other documentation that
the inventor or patent attorney are aware of within the organization must be
disclosed. 42 1 So again, while some commentators and law firms are advocating that
inventors and their organizations scour their records for potentially relevant
documents, this is not what the case law requires. 422 Instead, all that is required is a
good faith disclosure of material documents that the inventor and/or her patent
attorney are aware of within the inventor's, or her organization's, possession.423 In
Monsanto, for example, the notes at issue were well known within the inventor's
department at the company and to the prosecuting attorney.424
c. Foreign Language Documents
Extra care must be taken when determining which parts of material foreign
language references should be translated, or indeed whether the entire document
should be translated. 425 In Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., Ltd. v. Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd., the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's decision to hold
the patent unenforceable because only some portions of a 29 page Japanese language
reference were translated.426 However, this was only because the district court had
found that the inventor, who was also the plaintiff company's CEO, was a native
Japanese speaker and knew full well that the un-translated portions of the document
in fact contained "a more complete combination of the elements" in the patent at
issue than that included in the translated portion or any other reference before the
420 See MPEP, supra note 68, § 2004.09.
421 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (imposing a duty to submit all known information).
422 See, e.g., MAYER BROWN, FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT ON CONTROVERSIAL USPTO RULES
PACKAGE (2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=6375&nid=6 (suggesting
that the new rules may require applicants to "conduct and disclose full prior art searches").
423 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (imposing a duty to submit all known information).
424 MonsantoI 514 F.3d 1229, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
425 See MPEP, supra note 68, § 604.04(a).
426 204 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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USPTO and would thus decrease the likelihood of the patent issuing.427 The un-
translated portion, when added to other references cited, would have clearly made
out a prima facie case of obviousness. 428 Accordingly, this case does not indicate that
all foreign language cited references need be translated in their entirety, but rather
once again that materiality is the key. 429 Portions of a foreign language reference
that are material under any of the current operative standards must be translated,
and not simply submitted in their original language and/or summarized.43 0
d. Foreign Patent Office Searches and Office Actions
Similar to co-pending application issues in the USPTO, issues involving patent
applicants and their attorneys who are prosecuting patents on the same or
substantially similar invention/claims in foreign jurisdictions must disclose material
references and foreign patent office actions to the USPTO examiner that arise in
those foreign prosecutions. 431 The only exception here could be references that are
material only to the foreign examination process because of clear, accepted
differences between patentability standards in that foreign country and those of the
United States. But this just underscores that the key is materiality under United
States and USPTO standards. 432 The point is that the applicant or her attorneys are
aware of the reference-how they came to be aware of it has no effect on whether it
should be disclosed to the USPTO.433
e. Submission ofAffidavits and Expert Opinions
Extra care should be taken to disclose relationships between affiants and patent
applicants where affidavits are submitted in support of the patentability of the
invention. 434 This is especially true where the affidavits are being submitted to
overcome examiner objections or rejections to patentability.4 3 5  The affidavits
themselves must not be misleading whether that be by affirmative
misrepresentations, omissions, or submissions that fail to give a fair and
comprehensive representation of the data or information supporting the affidavit.436
427 Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 477, 479, 484 (E.D. Va.
1998), affd, 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
428 Semiconductor Energy Lab., 204 F.3d at 1374.
429 See id
430 Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(3) (2008).
431 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (imposing a duty to submit all known material information) (emphasis
added); id. § 1.97(e)(2) (requiring the applicant to identify if the reference was first cited in a foreign
application).
432 Id.
433 Id.; see discussion Part II.
434 37 C.F.R. § 1.56; see discussion supra Part 11 (particularly the discussion of Paragon
Podiatry and Refac).
435 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (imposing a duty to submit all known material information); § 1.132
(providing the requirements for affidavits of this nature).
436 See discussion supra Part II (particularly the discussion of Aventis).
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L Disclosure or Prior Use or Sale of Products Embodying the Invention by
Applicant
Patent applicants should be better appraised of the effects of undisclosed prior
public use or sale of products embodying the patent (whether product or process
claims) during patent prosecution. The failure to disclose such uses or sales can lead
to a finding of inequitable conduct.43 7 Thus, in Brasseler, USA. I, L.P v. Stryker
Sales Corp., the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of inequitable
conduct based on the prosecuting attorney's willful failure to inquire as to the dates
of sales of the patented surgical saw blade, even though he knew there was a
potential on sale bar issue.438 But, again, it is important to not over read this case.
It does not stand for the proposition that patent attorneys have a duty in all cases to
inquire or investigate as to whether there might have been sales or public uses of
products embodying the invention that would trigger the section 102 statutory bar.
Rather, the case simply held that where a patent attorney is on notice that there
might have been such sales or uses-in this case the attorney was asked to rush the
application because there might be an on sale bar issue-then the attorney should
inquire as to the nature of them and disclose them to the examiner accordingly. 439
2. Intent
One issue that has arisen for many patent attorneys through recent Federal
Circuit cases is whether honest patent attorneys could still inadvertently give the
appearance of intending to deceive the USPTO.440 This is especially important given
the frequent invocation of the inequitable conduct defense by infringement
defendants on the slimmest of grounds (as the Federal Circuit has noted).441 The
concern is that good faith, legitimate activities during prosecution could be turned
around long after the fact by shrewd litigators. However, the best shields against
inequitable conduct allegations are for prosecuting attorneys to: i) adhere
scrupulously to best practices in patent prosecution; and ii) be aware of the burden of
proof and what needs to be shown in inequitable conduct cases.
The only remaining issue is the burden of proof and showing that need to be
made in inequitable conduct cases. Initially, as an obvious matter, the burden is on
the infringement defendant to raise the inequitable conduct defense.442  The
defendant must make out a clear and convincing case that the plaintiff patentee or
its prosecuting attorney engaged in inequitable conduct during the prosecution of the
patent.443 Further, the "who, what, when, where, and how" of the circumstances
437 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (imposing a duty to submit all known information) (emphasis added).
438 267 F.3d 1370, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
439 Id. at 1382-83.
440 See, e.g., Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1361-62 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (finding an intent to deceive without any direct knowledge of materiality based on the
inventors failure to disclose truthful information to their attorneys).
441 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (referring
to the use of an inequitable defense as a plague on reputable lawyers).
442 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
443 Id.
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must be pleaded with particularity after Exergen.444 Given the range of activities
that can trigger a finding of inequitable conduct, it may still be easy enough for the
defendant to make out at least some prima facie case against the patentee or her
attorney. 445 The patentee could then simply respond that the case is not supported
by the requisite clear and convincing evidence. 446
However, findings of inequitable conduct seem to be affirmed by the Federal
Circuit most often when the plaintiff and her prosecuting attorney have either no
response to the allegations or cannot recall why they chose a specific course of action
such as withholding a reference that was determined to be material by the court.447
Further, given the Exergen interpretation of the heightened pleading standard under
Rule 9(b), allegations of inequitable conduct will need to be more specific to survive,
but this will mean that the patentee plaintiffs will be pressured even further to
respond to them. District courts and the Federal Circuit are more inclined to give
good faith "credit" when plaintiffs and their attorneys can give a reasonable
explanation why they withheld a reference or submitted it in a certain way, even if
the court ultimately determines that the reference should have been submitted, or
submitted in a different manner.448 However, the Federal Circuit has also made it
clear that evidence of good faith is not necessarily exculpatory. 449 Instead, it is a
factor that courts must weigh in equity. 450 Further the quantum of good faith
evidence needed to outweigh evidence of inequitable conduct varies depending on the
materiality of the information withheld or submitted improperly. 451 Because a highly
material document requires only a low showing of intent to deceive, then the plaintiff
and her prosecuting attorney effectively need to make a greater showing of evidence
of good faith (while also of course rebutting the allegations of bad faith).452 At the
same time, the plaintiff and her prosecuting attorney could also attempt to show that
the information in question was not that highly material.453 This would increase the
level of evidence of intent to deceive that the defendant would need to show, and thus
decrease the level of evidence of good faith that the plaintiff and her prosecuting
attorney need to show.454
Related to this, some of the recent case law suggests that patent attorneys need
to take more care in how they summarize, list, or submit references to the examiner.
Following an earlier precedent on burying the reference, highly material references
that are submitted without distinction in a long list of other less material documents
444 Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
445 See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
446 See Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365.
447 See, e.g., MonsantoI, 514 F.3d 1229, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
448 See id. at 1236, 1242.
449 See Carbide Blast Joints, Inc. v. Rickert Precision Indus., Inc., Nos. 95-1040, 95-1059, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 33800, at *13 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 1995) ("[T]he burden is not on the patentee to prove
good faith during the prosecution, but on the alleged infringer to prove deceptive intent.").
450 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
451 See, e.g., Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) ("The more material the omission or the misrepresentation, the lower the level of intent
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could be seen as misleading.455  Further, summaries or abstracts of material
references, especially those in foreign languages with no or only partial translations,
must be done with care to clearly communicate both the content and relative
importance of the reference. 456
The bottom line is that it is highly recommended that prosecuting attorneys use
notes or other mechanisms to help them recall why they made decisions related to
materiality and manner of submission of information in any given prosecution, as
well as communicate the content and importance of references clearly to the
examiner. Because litigation to enforce a patent can occur years after the
prosecution concluded, reliance on unaided memory may not be enough. Of course, it
may be that so many Federal Circuit cases affirming findings of inequitable conduct
feature prosecuting attorneys who cannot remember why they took a specific course
of action simply because the attorneys in fact were trying to deceive the USPTO and
thus have no credible story otherwise. 457 Nonetheless, some of the cases seem to
involve fairly weak evidence of intent to deceive. 458 But a determination of high
materiality of the reference in question, combined with a prosecuting attorney who
cannot or will not explain why he made the decision he did about the reference in
good faith, seem to constitute the majority of Federal Circuit affirmances of
inequitable conduct holdings.
B. Restricting Infringement Pleadings to Damages at Law to Cut Off Inequitable
Conduct Defenses
The wide range of inequitable conduct fact patterns seems to defy any single
tactical response by patent owner plaintiffs in litigation, other than simply to hope
that they can show that the patent applicant and attorneys did not attempt to
deceive the USPTO during prosecution. The suggestions in the preceding section can
help applicants and their attorneys establish records during prosecution showing
good faith disclosure practices. But none of this will likely stem the tide of
inequitable conduct accusations in patent litigation, even as the Federal Circuit
seems to be signaling its displeasure with the widespread use of the doctrine in cases
like Exergen and attempting to fashion new "interpretations" of binding precedent
and procedural rules to limit its use. As Judge Markey noted during the first
"plague" of inequitable conduct defenses, even reputable litigators who do not
actually have any real sense that the patent applicant or attorney engaged in
inequitable conduct during prosecution may still feel compelled to investigate and
attempt to raise the defense for their clients as part of the requisite zealous
455 See Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 948, 964-65 (S.D. Fla. 1972),
affd, 479 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1973).
456 See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
457 See, e.g., Monsanto I1 514 F.3d 1229, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding inequitable conduct
where the attorney failed to remember "anything" regarding omitted material).
458 See, e.g., McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 926 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("It is not clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent that the
applicant did not inform the examiner of the examiner's grant of a related case .... ").
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advocacy. 45 9 Yet, as Judge Markey also noted, use of the defense necessarily impugns
the reputation of the patent attorney involved and is a serious ad hominem attack.4U
Of course, if there is evidence that the patent attorney did engage in shady practices
with the USPTO then full-throated use of the defense is encouraged.46 1 Low integrity
patent attorneys should absolutely be called to task for bad practices. The issue
instead is what can be done for the apparently large number of unfounded allegations
of inequitable conduct. Exergen will certainly trim some of these, but only to the
extent that defendants cannot even concoct particularized enough allegations of
inequitable conduct. Vita -Mix, following Bose, may also discourage the use of the
defense because defendants will now be put on notice that the patentee plaintiff can
simply assert that it thought the misstatement or misrepresentation was true when
made to the USPTO.46 2 Essentially this flips around what had been the prevailing
state of affairs in which the defendant could simply assert an inequitable conduct
story, which the patentee plaintiff would ignore at its peril. Now the patentee
plaintiff can simply assert its good faith and the defendant will have to provide clear
and convincing evidence that the statements were made with intent to deceive the
USPTO. This may perhaps be how it should be. But, none of it alters the core
doctrine and Supreme Court precedent, which means that ultimately the doctrine is
likely to continuing creating mischief even if there is a temporary slowdown in its use
after Exergen.
One radical response is for patent owners to plead only for damages-at-law when
enforcing their patents through infringement suits. In theory, since the patentee
plaintiff would not be coming to equity, then it would not matter whether it had
"clean hands" or not. The unclean hands doctrine is only an equitable doctrine and is
specifically tied to the plaintiffs pleading posture.463 As the Precision Instruments
Court noted, the principle is that extraordinary equitable relief, such as injunctions,
should not be granted by the court where the plaintiff who requests it himself has
engaged in bad acts. 46 4 There appears to be no such principle for the ordinary relief
of monetary damages-at-law. Short of deception or other bad acts within a law-only
proceeding, regular or statutory damages should be awarded almost regardless of
what the plaintiff has done outside of the courtroom.
One might raise the issue of countervailing analogies such as the defenses of
fraud, duress, or coercion in contract law. In those cases, even if the plaintiff was
pleading only for damages at law for breach of contract-and not any equitable kind
of contract relief such as specific performance-then the defendant could still argue
that it was coerced or deceived into signing the contract. 465 If the conduct was
egregious enough, then the court may well decide not to enforce the contract.466
However, the analogy back to patent law and fraud on the USPTO is imperfect for all
the reasons that the courts stated in refusing to allow a defense in private actions
459 Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
4 60 Id.
461 See id. (requiring "clear and convincing evidence").
462 See Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
463 See J.P. Stevens & Co. v Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
464 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945).
465 See, e.g., Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 699 F. 2d. 1383, 1385-87 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
466 See, e.g., id.
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based on allegations of fraud on the USPTO before Precision Instruments. 4 7 While
in the contract situation the defendant is the party coerced or deceived, in patent
litigation between private parties the party deceived-the USPTO-is not joined.
Thus, in a "damages-only" suit, a defense or action based on fraud on the USPTO
could only be raised if the USPTO were a party.
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, the initial United States Patent Acts
did not even provide for equitable actions or relief for patent owners.468 Only
damages-at-law were available. 46 9 Once equitable relief was authorized in 1819, the
Patent Act and Patent Office procedure were still very much in flux, in particular as
to the nature of the registration or examination procedure in place at any given
time. 470 Further, up until the 1836 Act, members of the public could challenge issued
patents within a certain time period, especially on the basis that the patent "was
obtained surreptitiously by, or upon, false suggestions".471 Thus, in many cases,
private defendants in infringement cases could bring a separate proceeding with the
Patent Office to cancel the patent. Further, as also set out above, all of the Acts up
through the Consolidated Patent Act of 1870 authorized defendants to defend
themselves by alleging that the patentee had not included the "whole of the truth" in
the specifications for their patents.472 While not a true "fraud on the USPTO"
defense, the statutory provisions were directed to patents that were either too broad
("more than is necessary to produce the desired effect") or inadequately enabled ("less
than the whole truth relative to his invention or discovery"). 473 The defenses were a
kind of de facto "fraud on the USPTO" defense though in that they were based on
patent applicants attempting to mislead the Patent Office (and by extension the
public).
The narrow scope of the defense had caused some defendants to invoke equitable
principles to defend against patentees who had obtained patents or term extensions
through fraud on the Patent Office (other than misleading as to the breadth of the
patent claims or providing inadequate enablement). Thus, in Rubber Co. v.
Goodyear, the Supreme Court considered an appeal by defendants adjudged
infringers of the extension of a reissued patent of Charles Goodyear for vulcanized
India-rubber as a manufacture. 474 Among other things, the appellant-defendants had
sought to challenge the Commissioner's decision to grant the extension on grounds
that Goodyear's estate had engaged in fraud to procure the extension. 475 However,
467 See discussion supra Part I.
468 See discussion supra Part I.
469 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2006)) (providing damages for making, devising and using, or selling any patented art
without the consent of the patentee); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793)
(current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)) (same).
470 See Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, § 1, 3 Stat. 481, 481-82 (repealed 1836) (current version at
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006)) (granting federal courts the authority to grant injunctions).
471 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. at 111 (providing that such actions must be
commenced within one year of patent issuance); see also Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. at
323 (extending the time period to within three years of patent issuance).
472 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208 (repealed 1952) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 282 (2006)).
473 Id.
474 76 U.S. 788, 789-90 (1869).
475 Id. at 790.
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the Patent Act of 1836, as amended, did not provide for annulment or invalidation of
the patent based on fraudulent procurement-except in limited cases in an
interference proceeding or in an action brought by the United States Government. 476
The appellant-defendants invoked equity instead because the case had been brought
by Goodyear's estate in both law for damages and equity for an injunction.4 77
Specifically, they asked the courts to look at their allegations of fraud in the
procurement of the extension and set aside the extension based on that fraud.478
Both the lower court and the Supreme Court declined to exercise such authority for
reasons the Rubber Co. Court sets out in the following excerpt:
The 16th section of the act of 1836 authorizes a court of equity, in cases of
interference, to take jurisdiction and annul the patent issued to the party in
the wrong. Beyond this the patent laws are silent upon the subject of the
exercise of such authority. This review furnishes a strong implication that
i[t] was the intention of Congress not to allow a patent to be abrogated in
any collateral proceeding, except in the particular instance mentioned, but
to leave the remedy in all other cases to be regulated by the principles of
general jurisprudence. To those principles we must look for the solution of
the question before us....
The extension was granted by the commissioner pursuant to the first
section of the act of 1848 and the eighteenth section of the act of 1836. The
latter declares that upon the making and recording of the certificate of
extension "the said patent shall have the same effect in law as though it
had been originally granted for the term of twenty-one years." The law
made it the duty of the commissioner to examine and decide. He had full
jurisdiction. The function he performed was judicial in its character. No
provision is made for appeal or review. His decision must be held
conclusive until the patent is impeached in a proceeding had directly for
that purpose according to the rules which define the remedy, as shown by
the precedents and authorities upon the subject. We are not, therefore, at
liberty to enter upon the examination of the evidences of fraud to which we
have been invited by the counsel for the appellants. The door to that
inquiry in this case is closed upon us by the hand of the law. The rule
which we have thus laid down is intended to be limited to the class of cases
to which, as respects the point in question, the one before us belongs. We
decide nothing beyond this.479
Likewise, in Mowry v. Whitney Whitney had the first patent on an improved
process of annealing car wheels, while Mowry obtained a patent on an improved
process for the same, just as Whitney's patent was set to expire.480 Whitney applied
for and received an extension on his patent.481 Mowry presumably timed his patent
476 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 16, 5 Stat. 117, 123-24 (repealed 1870); Rubber Co., 76 U.S. at
797.
477 Ruher Co., 76 U.S. at 790.
478 Id.
479 Id. at 797-98 (footnote omitted).
480 81 U.S. 434, 434 (1871).
481 Id. at 434-35.
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and commercial deployment of the process to the expiration of the Whitney patent
because his improvement technique might still infringe Whitney's earlier patented
technique. Whitney sued Mowry and alleged quite high damages-higher in fact
than would be supported by the profits he had sworn to the Commissioner of Patents
to secure the extension. 48 2 In the course of that litigation, Mowry was unable to
defend himself on the grounds of alleged fraud in the procurement of the extension,
likely because of the reasoning in Rubber Co. 48 3 He was also apparently unable to
show that Whitney's statements regarding damages were in fact the fraud. Taking a
different tack, Mowry sued Whitney in a different action alleging inter alia fraud in
the procurement of the extension and praying for relief that the patent be declared
void ab initio.48 4 Whitney demurred and essentially admitted the fraud, but argued
that: i) the United States Government would have to be a party to any action to
annul the patent; and ii) both the original and extension terms of the patents had
expired by the time Mowry filed his action and thus the whole case was moot. 48 5 The
lower court agreed and dismissed the case. 486
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision on the grounds that no
private party can sue to have a patent voided without joining the United States
Government as a party.48 7 This was because the fraud has been perpetrated on the
Government, not the private party.488 The Mowry Court did consider an alternate
argument that the equitable decree sought was only between the two private parties,
essentially sidestepping the argument that the Government, as the defrauded party,
needed to be party to the action.48 9 However, the Court's position was that this
would lead to great problems because:
A suit by [a private party] could only be conclusive in result as between the
patentee and the party suing, and it would remain a valid instrument as to
all others .... The patentee would or might be subjected to innumerable
vexatious suits to set aside his patent, since a decree in his favor in one suit
would be no bar to a suit by another party.490
Further,
it is no hardship to require [the private party] to satisfy the Attorney-
General that the case is one in which the government ought to interfere
either directly by instituting the suit, or indirectly by authorizing the use of
its name, by which the Attorney-General would retain such control of the
482 Id. at 435.
483 See Rubber Co., 76 U.S. at 797-98.
484 Mowiy, 81 U.S. at 437.
485 Id. at 436-37.
486 Id.
487 Id. at 441.
488 Id.
489 Id. at 440-41.
490 Id. at 441.
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matter as would enable him to prevent oppression and abuse in the exercise
of the right to prosecute such a suit.491
Just as Mowry v. Witney was being considered, Congress passed the
Consolidated Patent Act of 1870,492 that would remain in place, as amended, until the
major overhaul enacted by the Patent Act of 1952. 4 93 Under section 61 of the 1870
Act, infringement defendants in suits at equity or law were given a complete defense
if they could show either that: 1) "for the purpose of deceiving the public the
description and specification filed by the patentee in the patent office was made to
contain less than the whole truth relative to his invention or discovery, or more than
is necessary to produce the desired effect;" or 2) "[the patentee] had surreptitiously or
unjustly obtained the patent for that which was in fact invented by another, who was
using reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting the same ... 494
Accordingly, through the end of the nineteenth century, defenses for fraudulent
procurement still appeared to be limited to cases in which the patentee had deceived
the Patent Office to obtain a larger scope of patent rights or had misappropriated the
invention from another.495 All other fraudulent procurement would have to be
remedied by intervention of the United States Government, such as in United States
v. American Bell Telephone Co.496 However, as both the statutory private defenses
and fraudulent procurement actions by the Government were based on common law
notions of fraud, private defendants and the Government had to show the requisite
scienter on the part of the patentee. 497
This was the backdrop for Precision Instrument.498 In this light, one can see
that the holding of the case is simultaneously narrow and broad. It is narrow
because it only holds that a court can invoke the equitable doctrine of unclean hands
to refuse to exercise its equitable powers to fashion the extraordinary relief in the
form of an injunction that the plaintiff has requested.499 It is broad because the court
can withhold such equitable powers for an almost limitless range of activities that
could be construed as "fraud light" or vaguely "inequitable conduct" that fails to meet
the high standards of the duties of candor and good faith established by the Supreme
Court for patent applicants and their attorneys.5 00
The question then is what happens to the Precision Instruments defense if the
plaintiff requests only damages-at-law. On one hand, one can respond that
contemporary federal courts are mixed courts of law and equity and so equity and
law claims are not severable.5 01 Along this line, then, nothing would prevent the
defendant from bringing equitable counter claims, even if the plaintiff only pled for
damages at law. But outside of the special category of Walker Process antitrust-
491 Id.
492 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 1, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1952).
493 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 1, § 1, 66 Stat. 792.
494 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. at 208.
495 See id.
496 128 U.S. 315 (1888); see discussion supra Part II.
497 See Am. Bell Tel., 128 U.S. at 353-55.
498 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
499 Id. at 814-15.
500 Id. at 815.
501 See id.
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based counter claims, inequitable conduct is raised as a defense not as counter
claims.U2 Thus, on the other hand, because the equitable doctrine of unclean hands
appears to only be triggered by the plaintiffs request of equitable relief-and thus is
limited to a rebuff of the plaintiffs equitable claim-then the defense should be
ineffective as to plaintiffs claims for damages-at-law.5 03 The plaintiff is simply not
"coming to equity" and there is then no request for an exercise of equitable powers for
the court to reject based on unclean hands. The Federal Circuit has made it clear
that there are still critical distinctions among judicial powers to determine question
of law, fact, and equity.50 4 Thus, the fact that federal courts can exercise all of these
powers in the same proceeding does not mean that the distinctions no longer have
meaning or importance. The exercise of equitable principles and powers still differs
significantly from the exercise of legal principles and powers, as well as from matters
that must be decided as questions of fact.5 05
One might further argue for the defendant that the court can simply refuse to
enforce the patent on even a "damages-only" basis if it finds fraud in the procurement
of the patent. But then we are back to the pre-Precision Instruments case law that
found this not possible if the Patent Office and/or United States Government were
not also a party to the action.5 06 Nothing in Precision Instruments overturns this
earlier case law, except to permit courts to refuse to exercise their equitable powers
upon plaintiffs request of equitable relief.5 0 7 Accordingly, it would take a new
decision by the Supreme Court to specifically hold that courts could withhold their
powers at law based on an argument of "fraud on the USPTO." One could also argue
that the Supreme Court's language about protecting the public interest in Precision
Instruments adds to the sense that a court should be able to refuse to enforce a
patent even in a "damages-only" suit for fraud on the USPTO if the public would
seem to be harmed by the deceptively obtained patent.5 08 However, the public
interest language was also limited to the context of justifying courts' refusal to
exercise their equitable powers to grant the equitable relief requested by the
plaintiff.5 09
There could be another analogy to contract law in the nature of the ability of
courts to refuse to enforce contracts-whether at law or equity-where the contract is
against public policy.5 10 There is still a moral utility doctrine in patent law which
provides a public policy type limitation on the kinds of patents that may be issued,
502 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (providing statutory defenses to infringement); J.P. Stevens &
Co. v Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-61(Fed.Cir. 1984).
503 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 282-283; JP. Stevens & Co., 747 F.2d at 1560-61.
504 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 873, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
505 Id. For example, if the issue to be decided is one of law, not equity, and there is a question
of fact, then the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial may be triggered. See U.S. CONST. amend.
VII. As the Federal Circuit has affirmed, this would not be the case for a factual question that a
judge determines to be necessary to her determination of an equitable issue. See discussion supra
Part II.
506 See Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434, 439 (1871) ("[N]o one but the government ... can
institute judicial proceedings for the purpose of vacating or rescinding the patent which the
government has issued to an individual ... ").
507 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945).
508 Id. at 816.
509 Id.
510 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2009).
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but this is currently a weak doctrine and only applied in the most egregious cases. 511
More critically, the doctrine is only applicable in the context of a patent validity
challenge.5 12 So the defendant would have to argue that the patent should be invalid
for lack of moral utility because of some dubious disclosures during prosecution. It is
not clear how well this would work because the morality involved in moral utility is
that of the making or use of the invention itself, not the applicant's or attorney's
conduct in securing the patent.513 Reaching beyond this, a defendant would have to
argue that a court could fashion a public policy limit on enforcement of patents for
damages-at-law even in the absence of anything that seems to authorize this in the
Patent Act. A court might be receptive to this, but it would not be supported by
existing case law or the statute. Further, any attempt to fashion a judicial rule to
this effect might be unconstitutional as a matter of courts' powers and statutory
interpretation. Therefore, the "damages-only" tactic would likely be a valid hedge
against the use of the Precision Instruments inequitable conduct defense until or
unless the Supreme Court rules either that the unclean hands doctrine in fact
applies to damages-at-law claims or that there is a public policy limitation on the
enforcement of patents solely in damages-at-law.
Note also that neither Rule 56 nor the IDS Rules separately establish an
inequitable conduct defense.5 14 These rules are only rules as to patent applicants and
attorneys behavior in interactions with the USPTO. 515 Tracing back to their origins,
they were intended only as aids to applicants and attorneys who might be unfamiliar
with the inequitable conduct case law.5 16 By the USPTO's own clear statements, the
rules do not-because they cannot-supersede inequitable conduct case law. 517
There are three remaining hurdles for the "damages-only" tactic to be deployed
however. The first is that a court might question the value or effectiveness of a one-
time suit for damages, with no injunctive relief or equitable settlement fashioning a
license going forward. Behind this would be a court's reluctance to allow the patent
owner to come back to it repeatedly for ongoing infringement. The court could argue
that this would be de facto equitable relief, and then either disallow the case or
permit the defendant to raise the inequitable conduct defense as if the plaintiff had
brought equitable claims. 518 However, this would be somewhat speculative on the
court's part, and perhaps beyond its authority to decide. Plaintiffs should be able to
request any available remedies at law or equity regardless of how advisable or
effective this may seem to the court. Further, in the early years of the Patent Act
only damages-at-law were available. 519 Granted that equitable relief might have
511 See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[I]nventions that are 'injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society' are
unpatentable." (quoting Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817))).
512 See id. at 1366-67.
513 Id.
514 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56, 1.97-1.98 (2008).
515 Id.
516 See Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5,588, 5,589 (Jan. 28, 1977) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) ("The expanded wording of the section is intended to be helpful to
individuals who are not expert in the judicially developed doctrines concerning fraud.").
517 Id. at 5,588-5,589.
518 The Author thanks Eric Schnapper for raising this point in a conversation.
519 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2006)) (providing damages for making, devising and using, or selling any patented art
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been added because the "damages-only" regime may have been deemed ineffective. 520
But this too is mere speculation. Equitable relief may have been added to the Act
simply because it seemed additionally advisable, not because the "damages-only"
regime was fatally defective. At the same time, the long-standing existence of treble
damages in the Act can provide a mechanism for a "damages-only" regime or claims
to be effective. 521
This leads to the second remaining hurdle-whether patent owners would want
to seek only damages in enforcing their patents. Before eBay Inc. v. MereExchange,
L.L. C,522 this may have been a tougher sell. It is widely acknowledged in the patent
bar that the threat of injunctive relief is the single biggest weapon in the patent
owner's arsenal.523 The possibility of an injunction keeps infringers from deciding
that infringement is a decent gamble because it is simply a matter of paying the
patent owner later instead of now-and possibly not paying at all if the infringement
is not detected, or the infringer invalidates the patent, or the infringer can obtain a
ruling that it is not infringing the patent in the later litigation. The Federal Circuit's
near "automatic" rule of issuing injunctions following a finding of infringement before
eBay made the threat of injunction that much more powerful for patent owners. But
eBay itself then diminishes the supremacy of the injunction over damages for patent
owners. 524 Because there are now a number of avenues for defendants to avoid an
injunction, even if they are found to have infringed a valid patent, more focus needs
to be paid by patent owners to the effectiveness of damages.52 5 Granted eBayis not a
decision that forecloses equitable relief overall when the court finds that the patent
owner does not satisfy its burden with regard to the four factor traditional tort test
for the issuance of injunction.5 2 6 Instead, it simply makes it harder for the patent
owner to get an injunction.52 7 But in such cases the courts have generally fashioned
equitable settlements in the form of licenses or other royalty bearing arrangements
for future use of the patented invention528 . Thus, equitable relief still plays a major
role for patent owners even post-eBay.
This Article takes the position that patent owners who know there is a good
chance that the court will deny their request for an injunction may well decide that it
could be worth avoiding the morass of an inequitable conduct inquiry and defense in
exchange for giving up the right to have the court fashion a settlement if the patent
without the consent of the patentee); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793)
(current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)) (same).
520 See Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, § 1, 3 Stat. 481, 481-82 (repealed 1836) (current version at
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006)) (granting federal courts the authority to grant injunctions).
521 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. at 322.
522 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
523 See, e.g., Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the
Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 100-01 (2001) (discussing the
potency of the threat of a permanent injunction).




528 See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(denying plaintiffs motion for a permanent injunction and ordering the plaintiff to file quarterly
reports indicating the number of infringing units sold by defendant for recovery of future monetary
damages due to defendant's continuing post-verdict infringement).
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is found valid and infringed. For example, owners of health care related patents may
be more susceptible to post-eBay adverse rulings on their requests for injunctive
relief where such injunctions could jeopardize public health interests.529 At the same
time, the threat of treble damages may be enough for the defendant to be willing to
settle with the patent owner out of court. Further, if the inequitable conduct defense
is taken off the table because the patent owner pleads only for damages-at-law, then
the defendant may be that much more willing to enter into an out-of-court settlement
with the plaintiff, especially if it knows that the patent is likely valid and infringed
by it.
The third and final remaining hurdle to use of the "damages-only" tactic is that
the patent owner will have to be scrupulous about bringing the suit when it becomes
aware of the infringement and not waiting for damages to rise over time, on pain of
dismissal of the case on the basis of laches. 530 Granted, this is already the rule, but
in a "damages-only" context, the patent owner may feel that it is critical to let
damages build as much as possible before bringing suit. This will be especially true
if courts would seem to favor a "one shot only" rule for patent owners to bring suit
against a particular defendant. But plaintiffs may then find that the damages are
insufficient to justify the suit either on a cost recovery or deterrent basis.
A final issue remains as to execution of the strategy. As discussed supra in the
context of Monsanto I and Monsanto II, there are a few avenues open for parties
adverse to the patent owner to raise or keep alive an inequitable conduct claim.5 31 As
a preliminary matter, however, this Article contends that a claim of unenforceability
for inequitable conduct may not be raised by a party sua sponte such as in an action
for declaratory judgment. The claim may only be raised as a defense to a patent
owner's action at law and equity to assert its patents.5 32 However, if/when the
patentee-defendant in a declaratory judgment action counterclaims for infringement
of its patents, then the door is open for the plaintiff to raise the inequitable conduct
defense. At this point, even if the patentee-defendant later withdraws its
infringement claims as to any patents the plaintiff may be able to keep the defense
alive as to those patents based on either a necessity-based-on-infection of other
patents still at suit or a timely motion for attorneys fees based on the exceptional
nature of the case (due to the inequitable conduct) under 35 U.S.C. § 285. 53 3
Similarly, if the plaintiff is instead the patentee in a regular infringement suit, and it
comes to court in both law and equity (seeking injunctive or other equitable relief),
then even if it later withdraws any of the patents, the door was again open and so
long as the infringement defendant can argue that inequitable conduct with regard to
these patents "infected" other patents still in suit, or if the defendant has already
filed a motion for attorneys fees based on section 285 and alleged inequitable conduct
with regard to the patents, the court is allowed to still find inequitable conduct and
hold the withdrawn patents unenforceable.5 34 Thus, a patent owner contemplating
529 See eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (weighing the public interest in the grant of an injunction).
530 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
531 See discussion supra Part II.
532 See discussion supra Part II.
533 See 35 U.S.C. § 285; Nilssen v. Osram, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding
withdrawn patents still properly within the lower court's jurisdiction for purposes of inequitable
conduct findings).
534 See Nissen, 504 F.3d at 1230.
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the "damages-only" strategy would need to make sure that it never requests any kind
of equitable relief in either its affirmative claims in an infringement suit or its
counter claims in a declaratory judgment action.
CONCLUSION
The inequitable conduct defense has been called a "plague" and its remedy of
unenforceability of all claims of a patent has been deemed an "atomic bomb" in
patent litigation by judges on the Federal Circuit.5 35  Congress has considered
creating a statutory provision to reform it.536 Many judges and commentators have
called for its reform as well.5 37 And yet it stands essentially as it did when the
Supreme Court established it in 1945.538 The reams of cases and amendments to
Rule 56 and the IDS Rules do nothing to change its essential nature, other than to
obscure that nature to those who do not fully understand the doctrine's history. It is
a massive trap for the unwary patent applicant, attorney, and patent owner.
This Article recontextualized this history to better reveal the doctrine's essential
nature. It then gave guidelines for how patent applicants and their attorneys can
establish a disclosure record that should withstand most attempts at use of the
doctrine by infringement defendants in later litigation. Nonetheless, the Article
acknowledged that excessive use of the defense-even in cases where patent owners
are well prepared with a strong prosecution disclosure record-can be costly and
vexatious. By the Federal Circuit's own account, such use has diminished the civility
of the patent bar and lowered the reputation of this learned profession.5 39 Therefore,
the Article proposed a radical tactic in which patent owners may be able to cut off the
use of the defense by bringing a "damages-only" suit. By restricting the plaintiffs
claims to damages-at-law, there can be no issue as to whether the plaintiff "comes to
equity with clean hands" because the plaintiff is not coming to equity at all.
Accordingly, the court would have no equitable claim to deny on the basis of the
equitable maxim of unclean hands. While there are limits to the value of a
"damages-only" infringement suit, the Article concluded by arguing that in the right
circumstances these limits are matched or offset by limits to suits that include
prayers for equitable relief as well. In such cases, the cutting off of an inequitable
conduct defense may well be worth the limits of a "damages-only" suit. After all,
defusing an atomic bomb or stopping a plague are always risky and may result in
some collateral damage. But the magnitude of the harm from the bomb or plague
535 See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(Rader, J., dissenting); Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
536 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R.
1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (introduced simultaneously in the Senate as S. 515).
537 See, e.g., Kate McElhone, Inequitable Conduct: Shifting Standards for Patent Applicants,
Prosecutors, and Litigators, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 385, 405 (2009).
538 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945).
539 Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[C]harging
inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case ... destroy[s] the respect for one another's
integrity, for being fellow members of an honorable profession, that used to make the bar a valuable
help to the courts in making a sound disposition of their cases, and to sustain the good name of the
bar itself.").
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may well dwarf the magnitude of the collateral damage. On balance, defusing the
bomb and stopping the plague are usually worth it.
